working papers
"Corruption and Term limits: Evidence from a Reelection Reform in Mexico". With Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. Under review.
"Women’s Representation and Corruption: Evidence from Local Audits in Mexico". With Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. Under review.
"Auditing Public Budget Modifications in Mexico: An Isolation-Based Detection Approach". With Francisco Cantu. Working paper.
"When do Governments Design Transparent Social Policy? Evidence from Subnational Programs in Mexico". With Tesalia Rizzo. Working paper.
(Drafts available upon request)
Dissertation
Electoral Incentives and Political Support for Anticorruption Reform:
Evidence from Latin American Legislatures
Over the last few decades the anticorruption agenda has catapulted from obscurity, becoming a million-dollar industry and a top priority for national governments, international organizations, and activists around the world (Johnston and Fritzen 2021; Sampson 2010). The rise of the anticorruption movement has led to the widespread adoption of anticorruption policies, such as the creation of agencies that investigate and prosecute public officials (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2022), the popularization of access to information policies, and financial disclosures (Honig et al. 2022; Szakonyi 2021). However, while anticorruption reforms seem to have a widespread appeal that could provide substantial electoral rewards for politicians (Bagenholm 2013; Bagenholm and Charron 2014; Pereira et al. 2022; Tsai 2021), anticorruption policies often exhibit underwhelming results and garner limited political support (Johnston and Fritzen 2021; Persson et al. 2012). The reason being, that while anticorruption policies can provide electoral opportunities and reputational benefits for politicians, anticorruption policies can also threaten the impunity and rents that they currently enjoy.
Under what conditions will politicians support anticorruption reform? In this dissertation, I explore whether electoral incentives encourage political support for anticorruption reform. I argue that, since anticorruption policies can be potentially risky for politicians, the decision on whether to advance anticorruption reform will depend on the extent to which electoral incentives overshadow the risks posed by the policy itself. Empirically, I use a combination of observational and experimental methodologies to provide support for my expectations. Using an original dataset on anticorruption initiatives introduced to the floor of federal and local legislatures in Mexico, the first chapter explores whether reelection incentives impact the likelihood of sponsoring anticorruption reform. I leverage a quasi-natural experiment—a reform that lifted an 80-year-old ban on reelection—and find that legislators with reelection incentives are more likely to sponsor anticorruption legislation. The second chapter takes a closer look at the content of anticorruption legislation (ACL) and theorizes that legislators will be more likely to support ACL with “innocuous” consequences since these pieces of legislation have the appeal of signaling anticorruption effort while not radically changing the status quo. I create a typology for classifying ACL based on their scope and consequences, and explore whether the strength of legislation impacts roll-call votes for ACLs introduced to Latin American legislatures. Finally, the final chapter uses survey experiments in Mexico and Chile to test the theoretical mechanisms outlined in the first two chapters. I plan to explore whether voters respond positively to politicians advancing ACL and whether the content of the legislation also impacts candidate evaluation.
Evidence from Latin American Legislatures
Over the last few decades the anticorruption agenda has catapulted from obscurity, becoming a million-dollar industry and a top priority for national governments, international organizations, and activists around the world (Johnston and Fritzen 2021; Sampson 2010). The rise of the anticorruption movement has led to the widespread adoption of anticorruption policies, such as the creation of agencies that investigate and prosecute public officials (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2022), the popularization of access to information policies, and financial disclosures (Honig et al. 2022; Szakonyi 2021). However, while anticorruption reforms seem to have a widespread appeal that could provide substantial electoral rewards for politicians (Bagenholm 2013; Bagenholm and Charron 2014; Pereira et al. 2022; Tsai 2021), anticorruption policies often exhibit underwhelming results and garner limited political support (Johnston and Fritzen 2021; Persson et al. 2012). The reason being, that while anticorruption policies can provide electoral opportunities and reputational benefits for politicians, anticorruption policies can also threaten the impunity and rents that they currently enjoy.
Under what conditions will politicians support anticorruption reform? In this dissertation, I explore whether electoral incentives encourage political support for anticorruption reform. I argue that, since anticorruption policies can be potentially risky for politicians, the decision on whether to advance anticorruption reform will depend on the extent to which electoral incentives overshadow the risks posed by the policy itself. Empirically, I use a combination of observational and experimental methodologies to provide support for my expectations. Using an original dataset on anticorruption initiatives introduced to the floor of federal and local legislatures in Mexico, the first chapter explores whether reelection incentives impact the likelihood of sponsoring anticorruption reform. I leverage a quasi-natural experiment—a reform that lifted an 80-year-old ban on reelection—and find that legislators with reelection incentives are more likely to sponsor anticorruption legislation. The second chapter takes a closer look at the content of anticorruption legislation (ACL) and theorizes that legislators will be more likely to support ACL with “innocuous” consequences since these pieces of legislation have the appeal of signaling anticorruption effort while not radically changing the status quo. I create a typology for classifying ACL based on their scope and consequences, and explore whether the strength of legislation impacts roll-call votes for ACLs introduced to Latin American legislatures. Finally, the final chapter uses survey experiments in Mexico and Chile to test the theoretical mechanisms outlined in the first two chapters. I plan to explore whether voters respond positively to politicians advancing ACL and whether the content of the legislation also impacts candidate evaluation.
book chapters
Guajardo, Gustavo & Vidal, Romero. 2017. "The Harmful Effects of Insecurity: The Decision of Moving From your Neighborhood". In Cultura Politica de la Democracia en Mexico y las Americas. Latin American Public Opinion Project.