Peer-reviewed Articles
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Guajardo, Gustavo and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. 2023. "Women’s Representation and Corruption: Evidence from Local Audits in Mexico." Comparative Political Studies, 57(9): 1411-1440. [Link] [Replication]
Guajardo, Gustavo and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. 2024. "The Gendered Impact of Revelations of Corruption: Unveiling the Role of Voters and Parties in Mexico." American Political Science Review 1-6 [Link] [Replication] Guajardo, Gustavo. 2024. "Incentivizing Anticorruption Reform: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Mexican Subnational Legislatures." Legislative Studies Quarterly 00(0): 1-13. [Link] [Replication] |
WORKING PAPERS
The Political Calculus of Anticorruption Reform [Paper] [Appendix]. Under Review.
- Winner of the Quality of Government Institute's Best Paper Award 2024.
- Winner of the William P. Hobby Award for Best Political Science Paper Presented at a Professional Conference (Rice University).
Candidate Selection and District Competitiveness: Evidence from Horizontal Parity Laws in Mexico (with Lucia Motolinia) [Paper]
Auditing Public Budget Modifications in Mexico: An Isolation-Based Detection Approach (with Francisco Cantú). [Paper]
Drafts available upon request for the following:
Corruption and Term limits: Evidence from a Reelection Reform in Mexico (with Leslie Schwindt-Bayer).
Auditing Public Budget Modifications in Mexico: An Isolation-Based Detection Approach (with Francisco Cantú). [Paper]
Drafts available upon request for the following:
Corruption and Term limits: Evidence from a Reelection Reform in Mexico (with Leslie Schwindt-Bayer).
Works in progressWhen Anticorruption Pays off: Voter Support for Anticorruption Efforts in Latin America.
When do Governments Design Transparent Social Policy? Evidence from Subnational Programs in Mexico (with Tesalia Rizzo). book chaptersGuajardo, Gustavo, and Vidal Romero. 2017. “The Harmful Effects of Insecurity: The Decision of Moving from your Neighborhood.” Inside Cultura Política de la Democracia en México y las Américas. Latin American Public Opinion Project. |
Dissertation
Electoral Incentives and Political Support for Anticorruption Reform:
Evidence from Latin American Legislatures
This dissertation examines the conditions under which politicians advance anticorruption policies. Anticorruption policies rarely receive widespread political support because they can be costly and risky for politicians. Yet, politicians still propose and advocate for these reforms. Why? In my three-paper dissertation, I argue (and show) that legislators are strategic when it comes to anticorruption, seeking to sponsor policies that will get them votes without jeopardizing their careers and rents.
I leverage original data on anticorruption bills introduced to Latin American legislatures, natural experiments, survey experiments, and interviews with politicians and activists to document the role of electoral incentives. Overall, results show that 1) anticorruption reform is possible under the right conditions, 2) legislators are responsive to electoral incentives but will seek to minimize the potential consequences of anticorruption policies, and 3) voters evaluate anticorruption efforts favorably, but certain contextual features make some appeals more credible. Legislators are more likely to sponsor anticorruption initiatives after high-profile corruption scandals, when they are members of the opposition and when they are up for reelection. Furthermore, legislators are more likely to sponsor punitive policies, which they believe are more popular and less likely to become law than non-punitive policies. Finally, evidence from a survey experiment in Mexico suggests that there is a mismatch between what politicians believe will get them votes and what voters prefer. While voters are more likely to view opposition party legislators sponsoring anticorruption bills more favorably than incumbents, they are not more likely to prefer punitive over non-punitive action, and they evaluate anticorruption policies more highly if they are sponsored in the absence of a scandal.
Together, these papers contribute to our understanding of anticorruption policies, politicians' incentives to advance them, and voters' evaluations of these efforts.
Evidence from Latin American Legislatures
- Winner of the John W. Gardner Award for Best Dissertation in the Social Sciences (Rice University)
This dissertation examines the conditions under which politicians advance anticorruption policies. Anticorruption policies rarely receive widespread political support because they can be costly and risky for politicians. Yet, politicians still propose and advocate for these reforms. Why? In my three-paper dissertation, I argue (and show) that legislators are strategic when it comes to anticorruption, seeking to sponsor policies that will get them votes without jeopardizing their careers and rents.
I leverage original data on anticorruption bills introduced to Latin American legislatures, natural experiments, survey experiments, and interviews with politicians and activists to document the role of electoral incentives. Overall, results show that 1) anticorruption reform is possible under the right conditions, 2) legislators are responsive to electoral incentives but will seek to minimize the potential consequences of anticorruption policies, and 3) voters evaluate anticorruption efforts favorably, but certain contextual features make some appeals more credible. Legislators are more likely to sponsor anticorruption initiatives after high-profile corruption scandals, when they are members of the opposition and when they are up for reelection. Furthermore, legislators are more likely to sponsor punitive policies, which they believe are more popular and less likely to become law than non-punitive policies. Finally, evidence from a survey experiment in Mexico suggests that there is a mismatch between what politicians believe will get them votes and what voters prefer. While voters are more likely to view opposition party legislators sponsoring anticorruption bills more favorably than incumbents, they are not more likely to prefer punitive over non-punitive action, and they evaluate anticorruption policies more highly if they are sponsored in the absence of a scandal.
Together, these papers contribute to our understanding of anticorruption policies, politicians' incentives to advance them, and voters' evaluations of these efforts.