Peer-reviewed Articles
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Guajardo, Gustavo and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. 2023. "Women’s Representation and Corruption: Evidence from Local Audits in Mexico." Comparative Political Studies, 57(9): 1411-1440. [Link] [Replication]
Guajardo, Gustavo and Leslie Schwindt-Bayer. 2024. "The Gendered Impact of Revelations of Corruption: Unveiling the Role of Voters and Parties in Mexico." Forthcoming at the American Political Science Review. [Link] [Replication] Guajardo, Gustavo. 2024. "Incentivizing Anticorruption Reform: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Mexican Subnational Legislatures." Legislative Studies Quarterly 00(0): 1-13. [Link] |
WORKING PAPERS
The Political Calculus of Anticorruption Reform [Paper]
Auditing Public Budget Modifications in Mexico: An Isolation-Based Detection Approach (with Francisco Cantú).
[Paper]
Auditing Public Budget Modifications in Mexico: An Isolation-Based Detection Approach (with Francisco Cantú).
[Paper]
Drafts available upon request for the following:
Candidate Selection and District Competitiveness: Evidence from Horizontal Parity Laws in Mexico (with Lucia Motolinia)
Corruption and Term limits: Evidence from a Reelection Reform in Mexico (with Leslie Schwindt-Bayer).
Candidate Selection and District Competitiveness: Evidence from Horizontal Parity Laws in Mexico (with Lucia Motolinia)
Corruption and Term limits: Evidence from a Reelection Reform in Mexico (with Leslie Schwindt-Bayer).
Works in progressCheap Talk or Meaningful Reform? Examining Citizens' Preferences for Anticorruption Measures in Latin America.
When do Governments Design Transparent Social Policy? Evidence from Subnational Programs in Mexico (with Tesalia Rizzo). book chaptersGuajardo, Gustavo, and Vidal Romero. 2017. “The Harmful Effects of Insecurity: The Decision of Moving from your Neighborhood.” Inside Cultura Política de la Democracia en México y las Américas. Latin American Public Opinion Project. |
Dissertation
Electoral Incentives and Political Support for Anticorruption Reform:
Evidence from Latin American Legislatures
My dissertation asks why politicians advance anticorruption policies that could pose significant costs for them. Generally, implementing anticorruption policies is challenging because the same group they aim to monitor and punish is in charge of their advancement. While scholars have underscored the lack of political incentives as the major obstacle, politicians do propose and advocate for anticorruption reform. Thus, an important and understudied question is the conditions under which they are willing to do so. In my three-paper dissertation, I address this important gap and argue that politicians weigh the benefits and drawbacks of anticorruption reform, promoting policies that will win them votes without threatening their political careers and rents.
I conduct the first cross-national systematic data collection of anticorruption initiatives introduced to Latin American legislatures to explore the types of policies most likely to be prioritized by legislators and study which legislators and under what conditions they are most likely to sponsor and support those policies. The first dissertation paper examines how three mechanisms--corruption scandals, individual electoral incentives, and punitive framing--can increase the benefits of advancing anticorruption initiatives by leveraging fine-grained data on the content of anticorruption initiatives, the as-if-random timing of high-profile corruption scandals, and elite interviews with politicians and anticorruption activists. In the second paper, I theorize that electoral incentives can increase the benefits of anticorruption bill sponsorship and exploit a reform that lifted an 80-year-old ban on reelection in Mexico and original anticorruption bill data at the subnational level. The third paper conducts survey experiments in several Latin American countries to study 1) whether respondents reward politicians for anticorruption efforts, 2) whether they distinguish between costlier efforts, and 3) whether they prize punitive actions over preventative ones.
Overall, my dissertation shows that politicians do seek anticorruption reform under the right circumstances. Legislators are more likely to sponsor anticorruption initiatives after high-profile corruption scandals and when they are strategically positioned to reap the electoral rewards of advancing anticorruption reform---such as when they are members of the opposition and can run for reelection. Additionally, while legislators are more likely to sponsor punitive anticorruption policies, these are less likely to advance beyond the first committee and become law compared to non-punitive anticorruption initiatives. These insights can inform the design and promotion strategies for anticorruption policies.
Evidence from Latin American Legislatures
My dissertation asks why politicians advance anticorruption policies that could pose significant costs for them. Generally, implementing anticorruption policies is challenging because the same group they aim to monitor and punish is in charge of their advancement. While scholars have underscored the lack of political incentives as the major obstacle, politicians do propose and advocate for anticorruption reform. Thus, an important and understudied question is the conditions under which they are willing to do so. In my three-paper dissertation, I address this important gap and argue that politicians weigh the benefits and drawbacks of anticorruption reform, promoting policies that will win them votes without threatening their political careers and rents.
I conduct the first cross-national systematic data collection of anticorruption initiatives introduced to Latin American legislatures to explore the types of policies most likely to be prioritized by legislators and study which legislators and under what conditions they are most likely to sponsor and support those policies. The first dissertation paper examines how three mechanisms--corruption scandals, individual electoral incentives, and punitive framing--can increase the benefits of advancing anticorruption initiatives by leveraging fine-grained data on the content of anticorruption initiatives, the as-if-random timing of high-profile corruption scandals, and elite interviews with politicians and anticorruption activists. In the second paper, I theorize that electoral incentives can increase the benefits of anticorruption bill sponsorship and exploit a reform that lifted an 80-year-old ban on reelection in Mexico and original anticorruption bill data at the subnational level. The third paper conducts survey experiments in several Latin American countries to study 1) whether respondents reward politicians for anticorruption efforts, 2) whether they distinguish between costlier efforts, and 3) whether they prize punitive actions over preventative ones.
Overall, my dissertation shows that politicians do seek anticorruption reform under the right circumstances. Legislators are more likely to sponsor anticorruption initiatives after high-profile corruption scandals and when they are strategically positioned to reap the electoral rewards of advancing anticorruption reform---such as when they are members of the opposition and can run for reelection. Additionally, while legislators are more likely to sponsor punitive anticorruption policies, these are less likely to advance beyond the first committee and become law compared to non-punitive anticorruption initiatives. These insights can inform the design and promotion strategies for anticorruption policies.