The Gendered Impact of Corruption Revelations: Unveiling the Role of Parties and Voters in Mexico[1]

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Abstract

Studies have found that women's representation is more likely to spike after corruption scandals. However, the mechanism underlying this increase remains unclear—are parties more likely to nominate women after corruption scandals, are voters more likely to support women candidates, or is it a combination of both? Using an original dataset of audit results and the gender of 47,000 candidates running in over 10,000 mayoral elections in Mexico (2000-2019), we find that voters drive the effect. While political parties are not more likely to nominate women as candidates in municipalities with recent revelations of spending irregularities, women candidates are more likely to win elections after corruption is uncovered. In contrast to previous studies, which expect strategic parties to be behind the increases in women's representation following corruption scandals, our findings underscore that increases in women's representation following revelations of corruption can happen *despite* parties and not *because* of parties.

Key words: Women's representation, corruption, Mexico, audits

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Recent research has found that revelations of corruption can be followed by increases in women's representation (Diaz and Piazza 2021, Reyes-Housholder and Thomas 2018, Valdini 2019). This relationship is more apparent in high accountability systems (Armstrong et al. 2021, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2018) and in countries, such as Mexico, that have increasing demands for women's inclusion and strong stereotypical beliefs about women being less corrupt than men (Guajardo and Schwindt-Bayer 2023). However, it is not clear empirically *who* is responsible for the increase in women's representation after corruption revelations. Are parties using women's representation strategically to clean their image in the eyes of voters (Armstrong et al. 2021, Valdini 2019)? Do voters prefer women in post-corruption contexts (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014, 2019, Benstead, Amaney, and Lust 2015, Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder 2021)? Or is it both?

In this study, we answer these questions by leveraging an original dataset of audit results and the gender of 47,000 candidates running in over 10,000 mayoral elections in Mexico (2000-2019). We test whether parties are more likely to nominate women candidates (i.e., the party mechanism) and whether women candidates are more likely to win the election (i.e., the voter mechanism) in municipalities where wrongdoing was recently made public by audits. We find evidence in support of the voter mechanism. While political parties are not more likely to nominate women as candidates in municipalities with recent revelations of spending irregularities, the probability of a woman winning the election in those municipalities increases by 4.4 percentage points—a 65 percent change. Whereas most research expects strategic parties to be behind the election of women in post-scandal environments, our findings underscore that in some contexts, women can benefit electorally after corruption revelations *despite* parties, not *because* of parties.

The strategic value of women after corruption scandals

Some studies have found that women are less likely to enter the political arena when corruption is present (Sundström and Wängnerud 2014, Stockemer and Sundström 2019, Bjarnegard and Zetterberg 2017). Others show that women's representation can spike after corruption scandals. Valdini (2019) found that the percentage of women legislators was more likely to increase in post-scandal environments, and Guajardo and Schwindt-Bayer (2023) found that, in Mexico, women are more likely to win mayoral offices after audit reports publicly reveal wrongdoing. Armstrong et al. (2021) linked the appointment of female finance ministers to spikes in perceptions of corruption, and Diaz and Piazza (2021) found that corruption revelations inspired female candidates to contest municipal elections in Brazil.

Although an association between the salience of corruption and increases in women's representation has been uncovered, the mechanism behind the increase remains elusive. On the one hand, parties may use women strategically after legitimacy crises, nominating them as candidates where corruption scandals, accusations, or revelations have occurred with an incumbent mayor. Traditionally, parties have resisted women's inclusion, exploiting loopholes in parity requirements (Baldez 2007) and marginalizing women even after they are elected (Schwindt-Bayer 2010, Senk 2021). However, the value of women's inclusion can change after corruption scandals. Once an incumbent party has been tainted with wrongdoing, it has a strong incentive to "clean" its image and provide a viable alternative in the eyes of voters (Valdini 2019). One low-cost solution for incumbent parties hoping to evade accountability is putting women on the ballot; if voters stereotypically perceive women as less corrupt than men, then a party may get more votes (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014, 2019, Goetz 2007).

Party hypothesis (H1): Incumbent parties will be more likely to nominate women as candidates after recent corruption revelations.

Yet, a recent empirical study in Latin America finds that, where corruption perceptions are higher, parties do not have more women on their ballots (Funk, Hinojosa, and Piscopo 2021). This finding suggests that another mechanism may be at work—voters. Voters have several reasons to prefer women in the aftermath of corruption scandals. First, voters may subscribe to gender stereotypes and view women as more honest, trustworthy, and less corrupt than men (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014, 2019, Benstead, Amaney, and Lust 2015, Goetz 2007, Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder 2021).[4] Second, voters might view women as political outsiders and less likely to have access to the networks necessary to engage in corruption (Goetz 2007, Sundström and Wängnerud 2014, Reyes-Housholder and Thomas 2018). Third, voters might also expect women to eschew opportunities to engage in corruption if they perceive them as more risk-averse than men (Barnes and Beaulieu 2019). Fourth, voters may respond to the party's selection of a candidate representing a fresh anti-corruption direction or being an anti-corruption crusader. For these reasons, voters may be more likely to support women in a post-corruption election.

[4] Americas Barometer 2014 found that gender stereotypes are alive and well in Latin America, with a regional average of 33 percent of respondents considering men to be more corrupt than women. Dominican Republic (64 percent), Peru (42 percent), and Mexico (41 percent) have the highest proportions of respondents who consider men to be more corrupt than women. *Source*: The AmericasBarometer 2014 by the LAPOP Lab (question vb51, non-responses excluded), www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop.

Voter hypothesis (H2): Women candidates will be more likely to win after recent corruption revelations than men candidates.

So far, evidence of parties and voters preferring women candidates after corruption revelations has been mixed. Observational studies have found that women are more likely to win after recent corruption revelations (Diaz and Piazza 2021, Guajardo and Schwindt-Bayer 2023, Valdini 2019) but have not tested the mechanisms behind it. Survey experiments have found null or small effects for voters preferring women after corruption (Elia 2024, Le Foulon and Reyes-Housholder 2021, Schwindt-Bayer, Esarey, and Schumacher 2018, Batista Pereira 2020) but have focused on the voter mechanism only and just in a hypothetical way. In this study, we offer a novel, replicable observational design that causally tests the voter and party mechanisms in one specific context, Mexico. We expect results to apply to other highly corrupt, party-centered systems where women's representation is increasing.

Data and methods

We use data on 47,141 candidates for mayor running in 10,119 municipal elections and audit results in Mexican municipalities from 2000-2019 to assess whether recent corruption revelations affect where women are nominated as candidates and their likelihood of winning the election.[5] Mexico is a country where party leaders have strong control over candidate selection (Kerevel 2013, Motolinia, 2021) and quotas require them to nominate women to all legislative and

[5] Section 1 in the supplementary information (SI) describes the data collection process and data coverage by state and election year.

executive offices, including mayors (Piscopo 2017).[6] Moreover, a large proportion of Mexican voters view women as less corrupt than men (Batista Pereira 2020).

We use data on 2,967 audits to municipal finances from Mexico's Supreme Audit Institution (ASF) to create a measure for *recent corruption revelations* in the municipality—our main explanatory variable. Auditors publish audit results a year after they conduct audits. Local news outlets often publicize audit results (Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder 2020, Stanig 2014) and discuss them on social media.[7] We code as "1" cases where an audit report that found wrongdoing was made public in the year before the election and as "0" cases where no audit occurred or no spending irregularities were found.[8] Wrongdoing implies that auditors found a non-zero amount of irregularities in the social infrastructure fund (FISM), which is exclusively used for improving basic infrastructure and tackling poverty in the municipality.[9] Following previous studies, we

[6] Parity requirements for mayoral offices started to be adopted in 2014, with states progressing at different rates.

[7] See SI section 2 for examples of audit results being publicized in local news outlets and social media, and SI section 3 for additional information on ASF audits. Recent studies have also found that the ASF does not hold partisan bias (Denly 2022).

[8] We focus on the year before the election to give party leaders ample time to react to audit results being published. Elections in Mexico are held in June and July, and parties register candidates a few months before the election. Most states register candidates between January and April (see SI section 4).

[9] Of all audits, 20 percent (572 audits) found no irregularities. As of 2019, nearly a third of all municipalities have received at least one audit (27.8 percent, or 815).

interpret FISM spending irregularities as corruption since they imply deviations from spending guidelines and are directly controlled by the mayor (Chong et al. 2015, Guajardo and Schwindt-Bayer 2023, Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder 2020).

To test H1 (the party hypothesis), we assess whether parties are more likely to nominate women in municipalities with recently revealed spending irregularities. The unit of analysis is the party candidate for mayor in a municipal election. We interact our indicator of *recent corruption revelations* with an indicator for whether the candidate belongs to the incumbent party (1) or opposition (0) and predict whether the party nominates a woman (1) or a man (0). To test H2 (the voter hypothesis), we assess whether a woman candidate is more likely to win the mayoral election after recent spending irregularities are revealed. We interact our indicator of *corruption revelations* with the candidate's gender to predict whether a candidate won the election (1) or not (0). Winning, of course, results from getting the most votes from voters; thus, this modeling strategy allows us to test whether women candidates are more likely to win the most votes and get elected in municipalities with recent corruption revelations.

For both strategies, we use linear probability models with clustered standard errors on municipality-election, and state-election year fixed effects to account for unmeasured factors associated with specific states and election years.[10] Under this setup, candidates in a municipality election are compared to candidates in other municipality elections in the same state and year based on whether they experienced a recent revelation of corruption.

[10] Section 5 in the SI explains our rationale for state-election year fixed effects. Tables in the SI include logit models and specifications with municipality and year fixed effects (sections 9 and 16), showing consistent results.

We expect audit assignment to be unrelated to women's representation in mayoral offices.[11] However, criteria for audit assignment are not random and can be based on performance indicators and signs of institutional weakness (Chong et al. 2015, Larreguy, Marshall, and Snyder 2020).[12] For that reason, we control for factors that could affect both the emergence of women and audit assignment. One factor is an index of human development and population in the municipality since some studies of women's representation expect a positive relationship between women's emergence and levels of development (Hughes 2011, but see Schwindt-Bayer 2018 and Hinojosa 2012), and these factors affect audit assignment in our data (see SI section 7). We also include indicators of electoral competition, specifically, the margin of victory in the last election and the Petersen index of electoral volatility in the municipality, since women could be sent to losing districts and municipalities with more recurrent audits could be more volatile and competitive for audited parties. Summary statistics for all variables are in the SI section 8.

Findings

Overall, we find that women are more likely to be elected after recent revelations of wrongdoing in Mexican municipalities because of voters, not parties. Political parties are no more likely to nominate women as candidates in municipalities with recent revelations of spending

[11] Analyses in the SI find that women are not more likely to be audited and auditors are not more thorough when women are mayors (see SI section 6).

[12] Analyses in the SI find that audited municipalities as of 2019 are substantively similar to each other, although audited municipalities tend to be slightly larger and more developed (see SI section 7).

irregularities, compared to municipalities with no revelations. However, a woman candidate is more likely to win an election in a municipality where wrongdoing was recently revealed, an effect that is not found among men.

Figure 1 presents the results for the party hypothesis (H1). Contrary to our expectations, we find that incumbent parties are not more likely to nominate women as candidates to municipalities with recently revealed spending irregularities; neither are opposition parties (full table in SI section 9). On average, the probability of a candidate being female is approximately 0.45, regardless of whether the candidate ran for the incumbent or opposition party or whether corruption was recently revealed. In SI section 10, we analyze whether *any* party is more likely to nominate women to municipalities where corruption was recently revealed. We find that smaller parties (PANAL, PES, PVEM), regional parties (inside the "Other" category), and leftist parties (MORENA, MC, and PT) are overall more likely to nominate women as candidates compared to parties such as PRI and PAN. However, a recent revelation of wrongdoing does not appear to strategically motivate a party to run a woman in a municipality. If anything, large mainstream parties like MORENA and the PAN-PRD coalition are less likely to nominate women after recent revelations.

Figure 1. Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0). Full model results can be found in the SI Table A.6 (column 2).

We ran several additional robustness checks on the analyses. We explored whether strategic action by parties is contingent on the gender of the audited mayor since we might expect the strategic use of women to only be valid if revealed wrongdoing was tied to a man. Analyses reported in the SI section 11 reveal that results do not differ depending on the gender of the audited mayor. Additionally, it is possible that revelations in the previous year do not provide enough time for party leaders to react strategically with candidate selection. Results in the SI section 12 show that extending the time window of recent corruption revelations to three years does not lead to different results. Analyses presented in the SI also test whether the null relationships hold when

we only consider audited municipalities (SI section 13); they do. Another analysis examines whether different relationships existed before and after the national parity law started to require quotas at the subnational level in 2014 (SI section 14). The effect of corruption revelations is consistently null. Finally, models in the SI (see section 15) include tests that address spillover concerns among neighboring municipalities. The null finding for corruption revelations persists after excluding neighboring (non-treated) municipalities from the sample that have been potentially affected by treatment.

Figure 2 presents the results for the voter hypothesis (H2). The figure shows that whereas male candidates are not more likely to win after recent revelations of irregularities, women are (full table in SI section 16). On average, spending irregularities published in the last year increase the likelihood of a candidate winning the election from 0.067 to 0.111 among women (a 65 percent increase). The effect of corruption revelations among women is most potent in the first year of the revelation of corruption (as shown in Figure 2). The effect size decreases after two and three years but remains positive and significant (see SI section 16). This effect is not found among men, with the probability of a male candidate winning the election remaining unmoved regardless of whether there was a recent revelation of spending irregularities. Figure 2 also shows that, on average, women candidates are less likely to have voter support than male candidates both when corruption has been revealed and when not. Models in the SI section 16 include additional controls, such as whether the candidate ran with a coalition, whether the municipality neighbors a treated municipality, the proportion of women that ran as candidates in the election, and party dummy variables.

Figure 2. Women are more likely to win after a recent revelation of corruption



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0). Full model results can be found in the SI Table A.8 (column 2).

The SI includes additional analyses that test extensions of our hypothesis and underscore the robustness of the results. First, we explore whether results vary depending on the gender of the audited mayor. The voter hypothesis (H2) expects voters to prefer women because they view them as less corrupt. However, if the revelation of corruption was tied to a woman, we would expect stereotypes about women being less corrupt to be weakened. Figures in the SI (section 17) show that the effect of recent corruption revelations among women is only found when the audited mayor was a man. Second, we conduct placebo tests with the year the audit was announced (before results became publicly available) as the explanatory variable instead, in order to assess whether it is in fact spending irregularities becoming public that is driving the effect and not anything related to

audit selection. Models in the SI (section 18) find no effect if an audit was conducted that same year. We also explore whether results hold before and after quotas started to be mandated for subnational offices. We find evidence of an effect both before and after quotas (see SI section 19). Effects are slightly larger in the pre-quota period, when women were less common in elections and stereotypes about women being less corrupt were stronger. As we did for the party hypothesis models, we also tested whether the effect holds when we only consider audited municipalities. The effect remains positive but loses significance (SI section 20 provides additional details). Finally, models in the SI section 21 explore whether results vary depending on the size of the revelations of corruption, finding consistent results. Women, are more likely to win when irregularities are greater than 0, but differences in the amount of irregularities produce similar increases in women's probability of winning.

Conclusion

Who is behind the apparent increase in women's representation after corruption scandals—parties, voters, or both? Using an original dataset that exploits corruption revelations at the subnational level and candidate-level data on close to 20 years of mayoral elections in Mexico, we find evidence of voters being behind the increase of women in office. While parties are not more likely to nominate women as candidates in municipalities where spending irregularities have been revealed, the probability of a woman winning the election increases by 4.4 percentage points (65%) if audit results revealed wrongdoing in the municipality. The same effect is not found among men.

This study makes several contributions. We offer an observational design that could be replicated in other countries to study the relationship between women's representation and corruption revelations. To our knowledge, no previous studies have explored these dynamics with

fine-grained candidate-level data, allowing us to distinguish the probability of parties nominating women as candidates in corrupt contexts from the probability of women candidates winning when corruption has been revealed. Additionally, our findings differ from studies that expect strategic parties to be behind the increases in women's representation after corruption scandals. We find that even for a party-centered system like Mexico, women benefit electorally after corruption revelations *despite* parties, not *because* of parties. This suggests that the mechanisms driving the increases in women's representation after corruption scandals may be context-dependent. Future research is needed to determine how generalizable these results are, whether parties learn and adapt to voter preferences, and to explore which contextual factors determine whether parties matter more than voters or vice versa, such as variation in stereotypes of women being less corrupt or the degree to which the system is party-centered.

Human subjects statement:

The author affirms this research did not involve human participants.

Ethics and conflict of interest statement:

The author declares no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.

Data availability statement:

Research documentation and/or data that support the findings of this study are openly available in the APSR Dataverse https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/FDW6CU

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Supplementary Information

Table of Contents

1. Details on data coverage

We collected candidate lists for mayoral elections through a combination of transparency requests to government agencies and state-level electoral institutes. We then identified the gender and party of 47,141 candidates running in 10,119 municipal elections between 2000 and 2019. We match our candidate data with municipality characteristics and election outcomes from mayoral elections from the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI) and the National Electoral Institute (INE). We exclude municipalities with indigenous autonomy, a common practice in studies of Mexican elections, because their autonomy weakens the grasp of national political parties from local processes and election methods differ considerably from case to case. Table A.1 presents information on data coverage for each Mexican state. We identified candidates' gender for all election years after 2000 for 21 states (65.6%). We have partial coverage (missing some election years) for 10 states (31.2%) and no data for the state of Oaxaca. We manually identified cases because our source data comprised messy low-resolution PDFs and inconsistent formatting within and across states.

Table A.1 Data collection coverage by state

State	Status	Election year coverage
Aguascalientes	Complete	2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Baja California	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Baja California Sur	Complete	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018
Campeche	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Coahuila	Partial coverage	2002, 2005, 2009, 2013
Colima	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Chiapas	Partial coverage	2004, 2007, 2008, 2015
Chihuahua	Complete	2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Ciudad de México	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Durango	Partial coverage	2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Guanajuato	Complete	2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Guerrero	Complete	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018
Hidalgo	Partial coverage	2008, 2011, 2016
Jalisco	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
México	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Michoacán	Partial coverage	2004, 2007, 2011, 2018
Morelos	Complete	2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Nayarit	Complete	2002, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2014, 2017
Nuevo León	Partial coverage	2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Oaxaca	No data	-
Puebla	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2018
Querétaro	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Quintana Roo	Partial coverage	2005, 2008, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2018
San Luis Potosí	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Sinaloa	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2018
Sonora	Complete	2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Tabasco	Partial coverage	2006, 2007, 2009, 2018
Tamaulipas	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2015, 2018
Tlaxcala	Partial coverage	2007, 2010, 2013, 2016
Veracruz	Partial coverage	2004, 2007, 2010, 2017
Yucatán	Complete	2004, 2007, 2010, 2012, 2015, 2018
Zacatecas	Complete	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2018

Complete = Candidate lists for all elections after the year 2000 were found.
Partial coverage = Data for some election years was missing.
No data = No data available for that state.

2. Examples of media publicizing ASF results

News stories below were translated with Google Translate's option to translate websites.

Story (1)



Tlaxcala, the pending accounts found by the ASF

The evaluation of federalized spending carried out by the Superior Audit of the Federation on state authorities, in the 2021 Public Account, classified the Government of Tlaxcala as the eleventh state with the most anomalies in the application of these resources, even though it is an entity with one of the smallest populations in the country

Luis Herrera

Although the state of **Tlaxcala** has one of the smallest populations in the country, the volume of **irregularities** that were found regarding its **federalized spending** caused its state government to end up being classified by the Superior Audit of the Federation (**ASF**) as one of those that They obtained worse results in that area in the **2021 Public Account** .

The total amount that was observed to the Government of Tlaxcala was 1,197,100,000 pesos, which means that there were only 10 states with more irregularities in this area of federalized spending.

Story (2)



March 2, 2023 4:27 am

The ASF makes observations to the Acapulco government for 64 million expenses in 2021

The federal authority presumes "probable damage to the federal public treasury." It finds that the municipality paid companies for the collection of solid waste and the provision of the service was not accredited; that invoices were falsified in payment for pumping equipment and works that lacked authorization and for irregularities in the award and contracting processes

Chilpancingo, Guerrero, March 2, 2023 . According to the Individual Report of the Result of the Superior Audit of the Public Account 2021, the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF) made observations for the municipal government of Acapulco to clarify 64 million 150 thousand 345.80 pesos, because it generated "probable damage to the Federal Public Treasury."

Story (3)



MILENIO

ASF finds in Coyoacán possible embezzlement for 440 million pesos; figure higher than irregularities in Fonatur

Raphael Montes

Mexico City /21.02.2022 21:25:27

The **Coyoacán mayor's office** could not verify to the **Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF)** in what it used more than 440 million pesos that were assigned to carry out public works during 2020, the year in which the demarcation was governed by former soccer player Manuel **Negrete** .

Social media

Luis Ángel Rodríguez @Luis_TV10 · Aug 16, 2022

Denuncian **irregularidades** por más de 20 millones de pesos en obras supuestamente realizadas en el municipio de **Mezquital**, Dgo., piden que la @ASF_Mexico atraiga el caso ante la falta de confianza en la @EASEDGO: @BernabeAguilarC. Diputado local

Ricardo Rocha @RicardoRocha_MX · Jan 31, 2023

Encuentra **ASF irregularidades** en la SEP por 830 millones de pesos

Del periodo cuando la maestra Delfina Gómez estaba al frente

Renata Turrent @rturrent · Mar 24

El exalcalde aún no puede explicar cómo incrementó su patrimonio de 40 mil a 14.4 mdp en un par de años. Mismo monto por el cual la **ASF** encontró **irregularidades** en la alcaldía que gobernó, por cierto.

Excelente texto de @HernanGomezB.

Source 1: https://www.reporteindigo.com/reporte/tlaxcala-las-cuentas-pendientes-encontradas-por-la-asf/

Source 2: https://suracapulco.mx/realiza-la-asf-observaciones-al-gobierno-de-acapulco-por-64-millones-de-gastos-en-2021/

Source 3: https://www.milenio.com/politica/asf-identifica-coyoacan-desfalco-440-mdp#:~:text=La%20alcald%C3%ADa%20Coyoac%C3%A1n%20no%20pudo,el%20ex%20futbolista%20Manuel%20Negrete.

3. Additional information on audits

This section provides additional information on audits drawn from the ASF's publicly available information and summaries of the responses of ASF auditors and former mayors to information requests.

How are municipalities chosen for an audit? Auditors use a risk-based approach to auditing, which is common worldwide. Criteria are secret but rely on the size of the FISM, historical performance indicators, signs of institutional weakness, and whether the municipality had been audited previously. For logistical reasons, the ASF sometimes selects municipalities neighboring those audited.

The auditing process. ASF auditors examine the expenditure and financial records of federal resources a year after spending has concluded (unless an exception goes through due process). Audits follow four broad steps. 1) Auditors select a representative sample of public entities or municipalities according to their criteria. 2) The audit is conducted. Before 2019, the ASF would announce its Annual Program of Audits (PAF) and auditors would visit the municipality or government agency to examine their records. These records must have been previously certified by the Tax Service Administration (SAT) and the Secretary of Economy (SE). Since 2019, electronic audits have become more common. For federal transfers, auditors revise both the distribution and spending of the funds. 3) Auditors finalize their report and send it to the Chamber of Deputies. 4) Entities subject to adverse audit findings are notified, and they can request supporting information for those allegations.

Do mayors control FISM? Mayors are the highest authority in the municipality (*ayuntamiento*). The law of fiscal coordination gives mayors discretion on the types of project FISM is used for, but the money must be directed toward infrastructure projects that benefit marginalized and impoverished communities. Deviations from these guidelines are considered wrongdoing by auditors. Additional checks guarantee mayors have responsibility and control over the FISM: mayors can hold "keys" to the account (preventing other personnel from accessing the fund) and quantities over 500 thousand pesos must be approved by the municipal government.

Are there any concerns over biased auditing? The ASF is constitutionally endowed with technical autonomy, hires its own personnel, and is internally and externally monitored. Regarding internal checks, the ASF receives integrity evaluations that follow a model developed in the Netherlands (*IntoSAINT*). It also has a system for self-evaluations, quality control, and an internal control organ devoted to supervising its administration. Regarding external checks, the ASF collaborates and engages in peer review with the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), the Organization of Latin American and Caribbean Supreme Audit Institutions (OLACEFS), the Central American and Caribbean Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (OCCEFS), and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Since 2018 concerns have been raised over the lack of independence of the ASF due to the appointment of a head linked to AMLO. However, personnel dismissed the possibility of biased auditing and underscored their technical autonomy, guaranteeing discretion on how to audit cases.

4. Candidate registration timelines

Table A.2 summarizes candidate registration timelines by state as articulated in state electoral laws. Mexican elections are held in June and July, and registration deadlines are mostly between January and April. This gives party leaders ample time to react to audit results published in the previous year.

Table A.2 Candidate registration timelines

State	Source	Article	Candidate registration timeline
Aguascalientes	State electoral code	142	December 1-15
Baja California	State electoral law	142	February 1-15
Baja California Sur	State electoral law	101	January 1-15
Campeche	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	390	February 1-20
Chiapas	State electoral code	233	44 days before election
Chihuahua	State electoral law	109	April 12-22
Coahuila	State electoral code	146	48 days before election
Colima	State electoral code	161	February 15-28
Durango	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	185	January 1-15
Estado de México	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	253	38 days before election
Guanajuato	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	176	March 1-7
Guerrero	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	270	Last week of February
Hidalgo	State electoral code	114	74-78 days before election
Jalisco	State electoral law	231	March 15-April 15
Mexico City	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	380	February 15-22 | March 22-29*
Michoacán	State electoral code	190	59 days before election
Morelos	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	177	March 8-15
Nayarit	State electoral law	140	April 1-15
Nuevo León	State electoral law	143	March 1-20
Oaxaca	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	184	January 1-15
Puebla	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	205	February 1-28
Queretaro	State electoral law	175	12 days before campaign
Quintana Roo	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	276	March 2-7
San Luis Potosí	State electoral law	260	March 8-15
Sinaloa	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	188	March 12-21
Sonora	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	194	20 days before campaign
Tabasco	State electoral law	187	January 1-15
Tamaulipas	State electoral code	209	May 5-15 | May 15-25 | May 28-June 3**
Tlaxcala	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	144	April 5-21
Veracruz	State electoral code	174	April 16-25
Yucatan	State law of institutions and electoral procedures	217	February 15-22 | March 22-29*
Zacatecas	State electoral code	139	January 1-15

* Vary depending on whether elections are concurrent with the governor.

** Vary depending on the population in the municipality.

5. Modeling justification

We believe that state-election year fixed effects (FE) allow us to better leverage the variation in our data. First, treatment variation within municipalities is very limited, compared to that within state-election years. We observe a minimum of 1, maximum of 7, and average of 5 elections per municipality because our analysis considers election years only. Moreover, as shown in Figure A.1, most municipalities are never treated (79%). Additionally, each election has on average 4.6 candidates, with 70 percent of elections having 5 or fewer candidates. With municipality FE in the test for H1, we would mostly observe incumbent/opposition and women/men candidates under the same treatment status. Similarly, for H2, the type of variation that we are interested in (comparing treated women vs. control women and treated men vs. control men) would be exceptionally rare within municipalities. Other common issues of including fixed effects for groups with few observations and limited variation are the instability of estimates, bias, and larger standard errors. Second, variation within municipalities would not account for important time-varying state-election year level factors. State-election year confounders are particularly important because administrative, electoral, and funding decisions are made at this level. Examples include the size of federal transfers for municipalities, how many women are required on party lists, how parties run together in coalitions, the number of audits, and the election-specific strategies of parties. We believe that we can overcome these concerns by 1) comparing municipalities within the same state and election year to account for unobserved confounders in a state-election year. 2) Controlling for theoretically relevant time-varying factors at the municipality level that are both related to treatment and outcome. 3) Clustering at the municipality-election level to address a potential lack of independence of errors at that level.

Figure A.1 Treatment variation within municipalities



6. Women and audits

Table A.3 shows the differences in means between men and women for whether a mayor received an audit [0/1] ("Audit") and the percentage of FISM inspected by auditors ("Coverage"). Neither difference in means is statistically significant, meaning that women are not more likely to be audited than men, and auditors are not more thorough with women mayors when scrutinizing the FISM.

Table A.3 Audits and women in office

Variable	Mean		Difference	p-value
	Women	Men		
Audit	0.068	0.062	0.006	0.1766
Coverage	80.71	80.52	0.19	0.8912

7. Audited vs not-audited municipalities

Table A.4 compares municipalities that have been audited at least once with those never audited (as of 2019) on key municipality characteristics. Some statistically significant differences exist (audit assignment is not random); most notably, audited municipalities are slightly larger and more developed.

Table A.4 Balance table: Audited vs non-audited municipalities as of 2019

	Means		*p-values*	
	Treatment	Control	Differences in means	Kolmogorov
Development index	0.850	0.858	0.001	0.004
Access to water	0.905	0.922	0.001	0.0001
Access to sewage	0.852	0.867	0.044	0.033
Access to electricity	0.976	0.982	0.0004	0.052
Previous margin of victory	0.148	0.134	0.017	0.122
Volatility index	25.383	26.177	0.182	0.349
Men to women ratio	95.739	96.016	0.244	0.095
Population (log)	10.797	9.221	0.00	0.00
Average schooling	7.195	6.695	0.00	0.00

8. Summary statistics

Table A.5 Summary statistics

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Woman candidate	47,145	0.215	0.411	0	1
Incumbent candidate	39,458	0.182	0.386	0	1
Candidate victory	47,006	0.201	0.401	0	1
Revelation last year	47,241	0.083	0.276	0	1
Revelation last 2 years	47,241	0.130	0.336	0	1
Revelation last 3 years	47,241	0.160	0.367	0	1
Previous mayor was a woman	43,957	0.050	0.217	0	1
Proportion of women candidates	46,660	0.214	0.236	0.000	1
Coalition candidate	47,239	0.242	0.428	0	1
Margin of victory in last election	44,541	0.145	0.156	0.0001	1
Volatility index	44,436	22.457	13.909	0.134	100
Human development index	47,082	0.831	0.068	0.000	0.92
Population (log)	47,120	10.063	1.391	5.489	14.42
Neighboring treated (potential spillovers)	47,241	0.296	0.457	0	1
Total treated neighbors	47,241	0.359	1.241	0	10
PRI	47,027	0.210	0.408	0	1
PAN	47,027	0.179	0.384	0	1
PRD	47,027	0.146	0.353	0	1
PAN-PRD	47,027	0.029	0.169	0	1
MORENA	47,027	0.049	0.216	0	1
MC	47,027	0.042	0.200	0	1
PT	47,027	0.090	0.286	0	1
PVEM	47,027	0.062	0.242	0	1
PES	47,027	0.015	0.121	0	1
CONV	47,027	0.025	0.156	0	1
PANAL	47,027	0.057	0.232	0	1
Independent	47,027	0.010	0.100	0	1
Other	47,027	0.085	0.279	0	1

9. Women as candidates (full table)

Table A.6 reports the results of different specifications testing H1. Results from model 2 are used to create Figure 1 in the main text. Models are OLS (1-4) or logistic (5-8), and all include standard errors clustered on municipality-election. The models are without controls (1 and 5), with the main controls (2 and 6), with additional controls such as coalition candidate and party dummy variables (3 and 7), and with municipality fixed effects (4 and 8). The number of observations varies for two reasons. First, the incumbent candidate variable will be missing for the first election because we do not have information in the dataset on who the incumbent party was in the previous election. Second, some controls have missing values.

Table A.6 Women as candidates and revelations of corruption

	Woman candidate							
	OLS				*Logistic*			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Revelation X Incumbent	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Recent revelation	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.35**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.09
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Incumbent candidate	0.04***	0.04***	0.03***	0.05***	0.28***	0.32***	0.24***	0.35***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Development index		0.18***	0.19***	0.61***		1.28***	1.38***	5.37***
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.15)		(0.34)	(0.34)	(1.10)
Population (log)		-0.03***	-0.03***	-0.11***		-0.19***	-0.20***	-0.50**
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.03)		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.19)
Previous margin of victory		0.08***	0.07***	0.00		0.50***	0.47***	-0.04
		(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)		(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Volatility index		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coalition candidate			-0.00				-0.02	
			(0.01)				(0.04)	
PAN			-0.01				-0.08	
			(0.01)				(0.05)	
PRD			0.00				0.00	
			(0.01)				(0.06)	
PAN-PRD			-0.02				-0.12	
			(0.01)				(0.08)	

MORENA			0.03**				0.13*	
			(0.01)				(0.06)	
MC			0.02				0.10	
			(0.01)				(0.07)	
PT			0.02*				0.15*	
			(0.01)				(0.06)	
PVEM			0.01				0.04	
			(0.01)				(0.07)	
PES			0.01				0.04	
			(0.02)				(0.10)	
Convergencia			-0.00				-0.03	
			(0.02)				(0.14)	
PANAL			0.03*				0.14*	
			(0.01)				(0.07)	
Independent			-0.28***				-1.54***	
			(0.02)				(0.14)	
Other			0.09***				0.49***	
			(0.01)				(0.06)	
Constant	0.08	0.21***	0.19**	0.88	-2.39***	-1.56**	-1.72***	-13.88
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.49)	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(1,526.04)
Observations	39,375	37,060	36,854	37,060	39,375	37,060	36,854	37,060
State-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Municipality and year FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.20				
Akaike Inf. Crit.					37,085.53	35,418.71	34,865.49	37,148.85
F Statistic	49.44***	47.65***	46.90***	4.71***				

Note: OLS (1-4) and logistic (5-8) regressions predicting a woman becoming candidate. State-election year fixed effects (1-3, 5-7) and municipality and year fixed effects (4, 8). Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. Baseline party is PRI for models with party dummy variables. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

10. Women as candidates (party models)

Figure A.2 presents the results of a model that interacts the indicator for recent revelation of corruption with a categorical variable for political party. For all parties, recent revelations of corruption do not increase the likelihood of a woman running as candidate. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.2 Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Party names are PRI (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*), PAN (*Partido de Acción Nacional*), PRD (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*), MORENA (*Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional*), MC (*Movimiento Ciudadano*), PT (*Partido del Trabajo*), PVEM (*Partido Verde Ecologista de México*), PES (*Partido Encuentro Social*), CONV (*Convergencia*), PANAL (*Partido Nueva Alianza*), INDEP (Independent). The "*Other*" category includes small regional parties.

11. Women as candidates (gender of the audited mayor)

Figure A.3 presents results from the main specification for two samples—cases where the mayor linked to the recent revelation of corruption was a woman (left panel) or a man (right panel). Recent revelations of corruption under female mayors yield a lower probability of a woman winning election compared to when female mayors had no corruption revelations, and this occurs for incumbent and opposition parties. However, the differences are not statistically significant. Overall, we conclude that results of the main specification do not differ depending on the gender of the audited mayor. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.3 Probability of nominating women and recent revelation of corruption, samples where the audited mayor was a woman or a man.



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0).

12. Women as candidates (revelation in the last 3 years)

Figure A.4 presents results from the main specification for cases where a revelation of corruption happened in the last three years. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.4 Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption in the last three years



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past 3 years (1) or not (0).

13. Women as candidates (only audited municipalities)

Figure A.5 presents results from the main specification for a sample that only includes municipalities that were audited. Units in the control group are cases where no irregularities were found. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.5 Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption (only audited municipalities)



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0). Sample only includes municipalities that were audited. Units in the control group are cases where no irregularities were found.

14. Women as candidates (quotas)

Figure A.6 presents results from the main specification, splitting the sample before and after a national law started to require parity in subnational elections (before and after 2014). While quotas clearly increase the probability of women becoming candidates in elections, recent revelations of corruption do not change the probability of women running for incumbent and opposition parties differently pre- and post-2014. Find full model results in Table B.1 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.6 Parties are not more likely to nominate women after a recent revelation of corruption (before and after quotas)



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0).

15. Women as candidates (spillover models)

One potential concern is that a revelation of corruption in a municipality impacts neighboring municipalities. If spillovers were present, this could bias the effect towards zero, explaining the null results for models predicting women as candidates. To address spillover concerns, we used data on the geometric location of Mexican municipalities and identified municipalities with contiguous boundaries. With this data, we perform two tests:

1. We run our analysis for H1 (models predicting women as candidates) excluding neighboring (non-treated) municipalities from the sample, thus removing the municipalities with potential spillovers.
2. We run our analysis for H1 (models predicting women as candidates) where we consider municipalities that neighbor treated municipalities as "treated" and compare them to the control group (non-neighboring municipalities in the control group). This analysis would help us determine if spillovers are in place.

Results for test #1 (1-2) and test #2 (3-4) are shown in Table A.7. We find no evidence of spillovers in neighboring municipalities. Models (1-2) exclude neighboring (non-treated) municipalities, and no significant effect is found for the interaction term *Revelation X Incumbent*. Models (3-4) compare municipalities that neighbor treated municipalities (*Neighboring treated*) in the control group. Similarly, no effect is found for the interaction term (*Neighbor X Incumbent*). Models include state-election year (1,3) and municipality and year (2,4) fixed effects, standard errors clustered on municipality-election, and all models control for the number of neighboring municipalities that were treated (*Total treated neighbors*).

Table A.7 Potential spillover models

	Woman candidate			
	Test #1		Test #2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Revelation X Incumbent	0.01	0.01		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Neighbor X Incumbent			0.02	0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Recent revelation	-0.00	0.01		
	(0.02)	(0.02)		
Neighboring treated			-0.03*	-0.02
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Incumbent candidate	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Total treated neighbors	-0.00	-0.02***	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Development index	0.20***	0.54**	0.18***	0.50**

	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.05)	(0.16)
Population (log)	-0.03***	-0.14***	-0.03***	-0.11***
	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.03)
Previous margin of victory	0.06**	-0.01	0.07***	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Volatility index	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Constant	0.25***	1.33**	0.22***	1.16**
	(0.08)	(0.61)	(0.07)	(0.52)
Observations	26,785	26,785	33,364	33,364
State-year FE	Yes	No	Yes	No
Municipality and year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
R^2	0.17	0.22	0.18	0.22
Adjusted R^2	0.17	0.17	0.17	0.17
F Statistic	35.40***	3.90***	46.89***	4.68***

Note: OLS regressions predicting a woman becoming candidate. State-election year fixed effects (1, 3) and municipality and year fixed effects (2, 4). Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

16. Candidate victory models (full table)

Table A.8 reports the results of different specifications that test H2. Results from model 2 are used to create Figure 2 in the main text. All models are OLS, and they include standard errors clustered on municipality-election. Models 1-4 use revelations of corruption in the last year, Models 5-8 revelations in the last 2 years, and Models 9-12 in the last three years. For each indicator of revelations of corruption, we include the model with no controls (1, 5, and 9), the main controls (2, 6, and 10), additional controls such as coalition candidate, proportion of women candidates, neighboring treated municipality, and party dummy variables (3, 7, and 11); and municipality and year fixed effects (4, 8, and 12).

Table A.8 Candidate victory, gender, and revelations of corruption

	Dependent variable:											
	Candidate victory											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Revelation (t-1) X Woman	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**								
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)								
Revelation (t-2) X Woman					0.03*	0.03*	0.04***	0.04**				
					(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Revelation (t-3) X Woman									0.03*	0.03*	0.03**	0.03**
									(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Revelation in the last year	-0.04***	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01								
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)								
Revelation in the last 2 years					-0.04***	0.00	-0.01	-0.01				
					(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)				
Revelation in the last 3 years									-0.04***	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
									(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Woman candidate	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***	-0.10***	-0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Development index		-0.07	-0.02	-0.07		-0.06	-0.01	-0.07		-0.06	-0.01	-0.07
		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)		(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)
Population (log)		-0.02***	-0.01***	0.02		-0.02***	-0.01***	0.02		-0.02***	-0.01***	0.02
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)
Previous margin of victory		0.06***	0.03*	0.04**		0.06***	0.03*	0.04**		0.06***	0.03*	0.04**
		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Volatility index		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coalition candidate			0.02***				0.02***				0.02***	
			(0.01)				(0.01)				(0.01)	
Proportion of women			0.09***				0.09***				0.09***	
			(0.01)				(0.01)				(0.01)	
Neighboring treated			0.00				0.00				0.00	
			(0.00)				(0.00)				(0.00)	
PAN			-0.22***				-0.22***				-0.22***	
			(0.01)				(0.01)				(0.01)	

PRD			-0.38***			-0.38***				-0.38***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PAN-PRD			-0.27***			-0.27***				-0.27***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
MORENA			-0.36***			-0.36***				-0.36***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
MC			-0.39***			-0.39***				-0.39***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PT			-0.45***			-0.45***				-0.45***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PVEM			-0.39***			-0.39***				-0.39***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PES			-0.46***			-0.46***				-0.46***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
Convergencia			-0.49***			-0.49***				-0.49***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
PANAL			-0.42***			-0.42***				-0.42***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
Independent			-0.48***			-0.48***				-0.48***		
			(0.02)			(0.02)				(0.02)		
Other			-0.48***			-0.48***				-0.48***		
			(0.01)			(0.01)				(0.01)		
Constant	0.35***	0.64***	0.61***	-0.05	0.36***	0.64***	0.61***	-0.04	0.36***	0.64***	0.61***	-0.04
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.31)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.31)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.31)
Observations	46,918	44,000	43,552	44,000	46,918	44,000	43,552	44,000	46,918	44,000	43,552	44,000
State-election year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Municipality and year FE	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
R^2	0.03	0.04	0.22	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.22	0.05	0.03	0.04	0.22	0.05
F Statistic	9.10***	10.43***	61.41***	1.08**	9.13***	10.42***	61.42***	1.08**	9.15***	10.41***	61.41***	1.08**

Note: OLS regressions predicting candidate victory. State-election year fixed effects (1-3, 5-7, 9-11) and municipality and year fixed effects (4, 8, 12). Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. Baseline party is PRI for models with party dummy variables. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

17. Candidate victory models (gender of the audited mayor)

Figure A.8 presents results from the main specification for H2 for two subsamples: observations where the audited mayor was a woman and observations where the audited mayor was a man. As described in the paper, we might expect women to be more likely to win only when the audited mayor is a man if gender stereotypes about women are really at work. The figure shows a higher probability for women winning in both scenarios, but it is only statistically significant when the audited mayor was a man. Find full model results in Table B.2 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.8 Candidate victory and revelations of corruption, samples where the audited mayor was a woman or a man.



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0).

18. Candidate victory models (placebo tests)

Table A.9 conducts two placebo tests:[13]

1. Test #1 assesses whether spending irregularities becoming public are driving the effect and not anything related to audit selection. Audits are announced a year before they are conducted and results became publicly available a year afterwards. Finding a significant effect of audit year (1 = audit was announced, 0 = no audit announced) would suggest that something other than revelations of corruption could be driving significance. Table A.9 uses audit year as treatment, finding no effect if an audit was conducted that same year (columns 1 and 2).
2. Test #2 compares cases where revelations found no irregularities ("clean revelations") with cases in the control group that were not audited, with the expectation being that there is no significant effect. This is confirmed in columns 3 and 4.

Table A.9 Placebo tests for candidate victory models

	Candidate victory			
	Test #1		Test #2	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Audit year X Woman candidate	0.00	-0.19		
	(0.02)	(0.14)		
Audit year	0.01	0.08		
	(0.01)	(0.05)		
Clean X Woman candidate			-0.03	-0.18
			(0.04)	(0.29)
Clean revelation			-0.01	-0.08
			(0.02)	(0.13)
Woman candidate	-0.10***	-0.78***	-0.08*	-0.65*
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.29)
Constant	0.64***	1.27**	0.68***	1.46*
	(0.08)	(0.43)	(0.10)	(0.57)
Observations	44,000	44,000	40,181	40,181
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.04		0.04	
Log Likelihood		-21,051.10		-19,455.36
F Statistic	10.38***		9.58***	

Note: OLS (1,3) and logistic (2,4) regressions predicting candidate victory. State-election year fixed effects. Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

[13] Find full model results in Table B.3 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

19. Candidate victory models (quotas)

Figure A.10 re-runs the main specification for H2, splitting the sample before and after a national law started to require parity in subnational elections (before and after 2014). Recent revelations of corruption increase the probability of women winning the election in both time periods (significance at the 95 percent level post 2014, p-value for pre 2014 was 0.06) but do not affect men's probability of winning. Find full model results in Table B.2 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.10 Candidate victory and revelations of corruption, samples before and after quotas



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means. Recent revelation of corruption in the past year (1) or not (0).

20. Candidate victory models (audited municipalities)

Table A.10 reports the results of the main specifications for test H2 (A.8), considering our main treatment indicator (Revelation of corruption in the last year) and with a sample of only audited municipalities. The models now compare cases with "clean" audit results to cases where auditors found irregularities. While we continue to find a positive relationship, the effect loses significance.

This may be a result of the much-reduced sample size, the small number of cases with completely "clean" audit results, and the small number of women in the control group. Our overall sample size drops from ~44,000 observations to ~4,000 observations. Out of the ~4,000 observations for these models, 599 observations have "clean audits." However, our data is at the candidate-level, and the 599 observations with "clean" audit results correspond to 99 unique municipalities. Municipalities can be audited more than once, and among audited municipalities, only 11.3% (92 municipalities) only had "clean" audit results (zero irregularities) for the period of study. Additionally, the control group of "clean audits" only has 167 women in it.

To explore whether the null results emerge from omitting the non-audited cases from the control group, we ran a placebo test comparing cases where revelations found no irregularities ("clean revelations") with cases in the control group that were not audited (Table A.9, columns 3-4). This allows us to test for differences among those groups that might suggest the non-audited cases are driving the significant results in the main models. We find no significant effect for clean revelations. This suggests that the large sample size in the control group of our main models is not creating significance when compared to a group of municipalities that were audited but not treated (had no revelations of corruption).

Table A.10 Candidate victory, gender, and revelations of corruption, only audited municipalities

	Candidate victory			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Revelation X Woman	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Recent revelation	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Woman candidate	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Development index		-0.16	-0.10	0.31
		(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.59)
Population (log)		-0.01	0.00	-0.02
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.15)
Previous margin of victory		0.03	0.01	0.06
		(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Volatility index		-0.00	-0.00	-0.00

		(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coalition candidate			0.07***	
			(0.02)	
Proportion of women			0.04	
			(0.03)	
PAN			-0.16***	
			(0.02)	
PRD			-0.35***	
			(0.02)	
PAN-PRD			-0.42***	
			(0.04)	
MORENA			-0.32***	
			(0.02)	
MC			-0.37***	
			(0.02)	
PT			-0.42***	
			(0.02)	
PVEM			-0.29***	
			(0.02)	
PES			-0.42***	
			(0.03)	
Convergencia			-0.45***	
			(0.05)	
PANAL			-0.39***	
			(0.03)	
Independent			-0.42***	
			(0.04)	
Other			-0.43***	
			(0.02)	
Constant	0.34***	0.55***	0.54***	0.27
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(2.05)
Observations	4,493	4,402	4,365	4,402
R^2	0.03	0.03	0.23	0.04

F Statistic	0.91	0.94	7.61***	0.33

Note: OLS regressions predicting candidate victory. State-election year fixed effects (1, 3) and municipality and year fixed effects (2, 4). Clustered standard errors on municipality election year. Baseline party is PRI for models with party dummy variables. *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

21. Candidate victory models (size of revelations)

Figure A.11 presents results from the main specification for H2 with a new indicator of revelations of corruption that accounts for the size of irregularities found by auditors. The new categorical variable has four categories: No revelations (no audit results or zero irregularities found), 1st tercile (bottom third of irregularities), 2nd tercile (middle third of irregularities), and 3rd tercile (top third of irregularities). We find consistent results. Varying amounts of irregularities do not affect men's probability of winning differently. For women, they are more likely to win when irregularities are greater than 0, but differences in the amount of irregularities produce similar increases in women's probability of winning. Find full model results in Table B.2 in "Supplementary Information B" available in the Dataverse.

Figure A.11 Candidate victory and revelations of corruption, size of revealed irregularities



Note: Predictions from a linear probability model with 95% confidence intervals, all other variables at their means.