

Incentivizing Anticorruption Reform: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Mexican Subnational Legislatures¹

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Abstract

While popular with voters, politicians rarely advance anticorruption policies because they can personally inconvenience them. When do the benefits of anticorruption reform outweigh the costs? I explore the role of electoral incentives by leveraging original data on over 600 anticorruption initiatives introduced to state legislatures in Mexico and an overlap between two reforms—one that required states to create local anticorruption systems and one that lifted an 80-year-old ban on reelection. Results show that legislators with reelection incentives were more likely to advance anticorruption initiatives and more likely to comply with the creation of local anticorruption systems. Findings underscore that while anticorruption reform is often met with resistance because corruption benefits those in power, electoral incentives can generate conditions under which reform takes place.

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Throughout the global south, politicians, activists, and journalists face considerable challenges when pursuing anticorruption action. Candidates speaking out against corruption can face resistance and violence, as exemplified by the Ecuadorian presidential hopeful Fernando Villavicencio, who was tragically murdered a week before the run-off election of 2023 (Reuters 2023). Hundreds of journalists investigating government wrongdoing have faced arbitrary detentions, torture, or been forced into exile to escape imprisonment (Villa 2022). Among politicians, anticorruption efforts are considered a contentious and divisive issue (Rose-Ackerman 2013). In Mexico, despite considerable pressures from civil society to undergo anticorruption reform, legislators refused to call extraordinary sessions and delayed discussions, raising concerns over the effects of disclosing their assets and losing procedural immunity (Semple 2016; Merino 2015).

One reason why anticorruption reform is uncommon is that it can inconvenience politicians who have so far benefitted from the corrupt status quo (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2022; Rose-Ackerman 2013). Anticorruption reform poses an interesting dilemma—While an anticorruption agenda would be popular with voters (Bagenholm 2013; Bagenholm and Charron 2014; Pereira et al. 2022; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016; Tsai et al. 2021) and could credibly be advanced by politicians across the ideological spectrum to win votes, anticorruption policies can carry significant costs. Transparency reforms can force politicians to disclose information about their assets and conflicts of interest (Szakonyi 2023), access to information policies and increased participation of civil society can raise scrutiny into actions that have so far been comfortably discretionary (Berliner and Erlich 2015), increased regulation in public procurement processes can limit corrupt dealings in contracts (Fazekas and Kocsis 2020), and the creation of independent anticorruption agencies can lead to increased prosecutions, destitutions, and even criminal convictions (Pozsgai-Alvarez

2022). Advancing anticorruption legislation could also put legislators at odds with networks of corruption, colleagues, and party elites that provide opportunities for career advancement.

Why do politicians advance inconvenient anticorruption reform? When will the benefits of anticorruption reform outweigh the costs? In this paper, I argue that electoral incentives can increase the likelihood of politicians advancing anticorruption reform. While anticorruption policies have a universal appeal that makes them a popular policy to pursue, they can also be inconvenient to politicians in a highly corrupt country. However, if the electoral benefits of anticorruption reform were to increase—via electoral reform or pressures from civil society—politicians should be more willing to pursue anticorruption reform. I theorize that politicians will be more likely to advance anticorruption reform when electoral rules give voters a say over their political survival. Compared to term-limited legislators, those with reelection incentives should be more likely to sponsor anticorruption initiatives since they can benefit from sponsoring popular policies and could be held accountable by voters for failing to enact anticorruption reform when anticorruption sentiment is high.

Empirically, I explore the role of electoral incentives by leveraging a natural experiment and an original dataset of over 600 anticorruption initiatives introduced to the floor of state legislatures in Mexico. The Mexican case provides a unique opportunity to study whether electoral incentives can increase anticorruption sponsorship in a highly corrupt system. In 2015, the federal Congress passed reforms that created the National Anticorruption System (SNA). The constitutional reform required state legislatures to update and harmonize their constitutions to comply with federal standards, creating local anticorruption systems. The creation of local systems had strong implications for politicians since the SNA grouped oversight bodies and civil society actors with mechanisms for a coordinated response in the fight against corruption, establishing

explicit responsibilities and sanctions for government actors (Fonseca 2019; Meyer and Hinojosa 2018). While all states were formally required to comply, legislators had discretion on how much effort they devoted to the harmonization process, and there were no explicit consequences for failing to meet the deadlines. Most significantly, the timeline to harmonize local legislation and create local anticorruption systems overlapped with a reelection reform that lifted a historic 80-year-old ban on reelection (Motolinia 2021). The overlap of the two reforms generated unique variation in reelection incentives—a time window where *all* legislators felt pressures to enact anticorruption reform, but only *some* legislators could run for reelection.

Results show that legislators with reelection incentives were more likely to advance anticorruption initiatives and comply with the creation and harmonization of the local anticorruption systems. Findings from this study suggest that—even in highly corrupt systems such as Mexico—electoral incentives can drive legislators to advance anticorruption policies. These findings have substantial implications for anticorruption scholarship, which has long highlighted the lack of political support as the main challenge that anticorruption policies face (Johnston and Fritzen 2021; Sampson 2010). While anticorruption reform is often met with resistance because it benefits those in power, electoral pressures can work to generate conditions under which anticorruption reform takes place. Additionally, this study provides a new avenue for exploring political will to advance anticorruption reform: the legislative process. Legislatures could provide valuable insights into the conditions under which politicians advance anticorruption reform, informing the design and lobbying strategies of anticorruption proposals.

Electoral incentives and anticorruption reform

The dilemma of anticorruption reform

Anticorruption policies pose an interesting political dilemma for two reasons: 1) they are universally popular with voters, and 2) anticorruption policies often carry measures that, if implemented, could personally inconvenience politicians. Concerning the first point, advancing anticorruption reform has clear benefits. Anticorruption policies have a broad appeal that could raise a politician's popularity and "clean" their profile. Moreover, while most policies fall somewhere in the left-right spectrum, politicians across the ideological aisle could credibly pursue an anticorruption agenda. Since fighting corruption is a valence issue, there is a broad consensus among voters that corruption is undesirable and individuals are unlikely to oppose anticorruption efforts.³

The exponential growth of the anticorruption industry, cross-national surveys, and academic research all provide evidence of the widespread appeal of anticorruption policies. In the last few decades, the global anticorruption industry has grown to become a million-dollar venture (Johnston and Fritzen 2021; Sampson 2010). In 2017, for example, financial support for supreme audit institutions in developing countries grossed 68.4 million USD.⁴ A growing backlash against corruption in cross-national surveys has mirrored this growth. Both Gallup International's *Annual Poll* and Pew Research Center's *Global Attitudes* survey in 2014 found that respondents worldwide considered corruption to be one of the most serious (if not the most serious) problems facing the

³ There are no "pro" corruption politicians, activist groups, or NGOs.

⁴ "Review of INTOSAI Donor Cooperation 2018." <https://intosaidonor.org/>

world.⁵ Similarly, respondents of the *Global Corruption Barometer* overwhelmingly disapprove of their government's handling of the corruption problem, with the regional average being 53.17 percent.⁶ Scholarship has underscored how anticorruption can be electorally profitable. In Eastern Europe, Bagenholm (2013) noted the potential electoral rewards of running as an anticorruption party and Bagenholm and Charron (2014) found that parties that politicized corruption in their campaigns had significantly larger electoral gains than parties that did not politicize corruption. Experiments have also noted the benefits of anticorruption action. In China, Tsai et al. (2021) found that respondents viewed politicians who punished corruption more favorably. In Spain, Pereira et al. (2022) found that respondents preferred politicians and parties that advanced transparency efforts and sanctions for corruption.

Despite the popularity of anticorruption policies, politicians are often reluctant to undergo meaningful reform. Even when anticorruption reform reaches the implementation phase, enforcement can be uneven, inconsequential, or eventually halted. The formerly successful Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in Indonesia, which presented high conviction rates, was subsequently undermined (Butt, 2011). The Brazilian anticorruption probe *Lava Jato* faced a similar fate. The task force was disbanded in early 2021 after successfully uncovering the Odebrecht scandal, jailing a former president, impeaching the current president, and securing jail time for the fifth richest man in Brazil (The Economist 2021). In Guatemala and Honduras, two of

⁵ For respondents in the *America's Barometer*, those considering corruption the most serious problem in their respective countries grew from 4.1 percent in 2004 to 11.12 percent in 2018.

⁶ For Latin America (2017), the lowest percentage of respondents replying "badly" was 28 (Guatemala), and the largest 76 (Venezuela).

the most effective anticorruption bodies in the region were forced to end their operations in 2020 (Schneider 2020). Throughout widely different contexts, the success of large-scale anticorruption efforts has ranged from limited to mixed (Johnston and Fritzen 2021; Khan et al. 2016; Rothstein 2009).

Scholars have suggested that the main reason why politicians often oppose anticorruption reform is that anticorruption policies can carry a high degree of personal cost for politicians, particularly for those who have been benefiting from the system so far (Pozsgai-Alvarez 2022; Rose-Ackerman 2013). Financial disclosures can force politicians to reveal their assets and conflicts of interest to the public, transparency requirements and open government policies can increase monitoring over actions that have so far been comfortably discretionary, public procurement regulation can make it harder to limit competition and favor certain bidders, sanctions can significantly raise the cost of engaging in corruption, and the creation of independent anticorruption agencies can lead to prosecution and prison sentences.

Several cases in Latin America exemplify how anticorruption reform can be inconvenient. Before Lula da Silva became president of Brazil, accountability institutions in the country were considered by many to be “toothless.” Ironically, the empowerment of anticorruption institutions led to the downfall of Lula’s government and his eventual imprisonment (Abut 2022). In Honduras, the anticorruption agency successfully prosecuted 80 government officials, which included cabinet ministers and legislators. In Guatemala, the Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) indicted over 600 individuals and convicted 310, including former presidents, a supreme court magistrate, ministers, and party elites (Schneider 2020).

The role of electoral incentives

When will the benefits of anticorruption reform outweigh the costs? Few studies directly explore *when* politicians are incentivized to pursue anticorruption reform. Existing research on anticorruption policies has overwhelmingly focused on policy implementation, with single-country studies evaluating the success of specific policies (Butt 2011, Doig and Riley 1998; Szakonyi 2021; Pozsgai-Alvarez 2022) and laboratory experiments exploring which measures reduce corrupt behavior among individuals (Serra and Abbink 2012; Banerjee 2016). While previous research has examined the relationship between electoral institutions and corruption (Chang and Golden 2007; Lederman et al. 2005; Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005; Persson et al. 2003; Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits 2016), most studies have focused on uncovering the factors that disincentivize corrupt behavior among public officials, which is distinct from finding when politicians are more likely to *advance* anticorruption efforts. For example, research by Ferraz and Finan (2011) explores the relationship between reelection incentives and mayoral malfeasance. Along the same line, Chang and Golden (2007) theorize that incentives to engage in corruption change with electoral institutions, such as list type and district magnitude.

Research that explores the conditions under which politicians implement reforms that constrain their discretion provides the closest instance of relevance for this study. These studies underscore the role of electoral incentives and accountability, finding that politicians can strategically advance inconvenient reforms under the right circumstances. Berliner and Erlich (2015) focus on access-to-information laws, finding that political competition was a major driver of the passage of such laws in Mexico. Similarly, Grzymala-Busse (2006) found that variation in the extent to which post-communist countries created oversight bodies was explained by their respective levels of electoral competition. Lastly, Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits (2016) found that

when clarity of responsibility was high—measured as whether there is single-party control of government—incumbent governments in Central and Eastern Europe were more likely to join anticorruption international conventions.

I theorize that electoral incentives can increase the likelihood of legislators advancing anticorruption reform. While anticorruption policies have a broad appeal that would make them a popular policy to pursue most of the time, they can also be inconvenient for politicians in a highly corrupt country. Therefore, politicians should be more likely to advance anticorruption policies when electoral incentives either increase the rewards of anticorruption action and the penalties for failing to implement reform.

One avenue for increasing electoral incentives is issue salience. Research has found that national and international audiences can pressure politicians to act after major corruption scandals (Vera and Pozsgai-Alvarez 2022). In Chile, a massive drop in Bachelet's approval rate (40 to 31 percent) after her son was accused of money laundering and an investigation found that a powerful business conglomerate was illegally financing electoral campaigns pressured her to create the *Presidential Advisory Commission on Conflict of Interest, the Trafficking of Influences, and Corruption* (Silva 2022). In Argentina, a series of major corruption scandals during the Menem administration (1989-1999) led to the eventual creation of the *Anticorruption Office* (Balan 2022). In Honduras, widespread protests led to the creation of the *Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras* (MACCIH) after it was revealed that \$300 million were stolen from the Honduran Social Security Institute to be used in the 2013 election campaign of President Juan Orlando Hernandez.

Another avenue for increasing electoral incentives to advance anticorruption reform is electoral rules. Canonical studies have assumed that legislators want to remain in office, create

policy, and advance their careers (Fenno 1977; Smith and Remington 2001). When electoral rules place political survival in the hands of voters, legislators are incentivized to pursue a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995; Shugart 1993; Crisp et al. 2004). In order to do so, legislators engage in a multitude of activities in the hopes of increasing their popularity among voters. Legislators can seek to draw in pork for their districts, position-take relevant issues, draft and credit-claim popular legislation, or avoid opposing policies important to their constituents. When electoral rules give voters a say over their political survival, legislators are more likely to be responsive because they could 1) directly benefit from sponsoring popular policies or 2) be held accountable by voters for failing to enact policies important to them. In the context of anticorruption reform, I expect politicians to be more responsive to anticorruption demands when electoral rules incentivize responsiveness.

Reelection and anticorruption reform in Mexico

I leverage a natural experiment in Mexican state legislatures to explore the effect of electoral incentives on anticorruption reform. The years between 2015 and 2017 were crucial for anticorruption reform in Mexico. High-profile corruption scandals, such as the *Oceanografía* scandal and the “*White house*” of President Enrique Peña Nieto, made corruption one of the most urgent concerns for citizens.⁷ Intense pressures from civil society drove the Peña Nieto

⁷ Pew Research found that corruption was the top concern for respondents in 2017, with 84 percent considering corrupt politicians to be a “very big problem” for the country (<https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2017/09/14/mexicans-are-downbeat-about-their-countrys-direction/>).

administration to pass a series of constitutional reforms, with one of the key ones being the creation of the National Anticorruption System (SNA), approved by the federal Congress in May 2015 (article 113 of the constitution). The SNA aims to prevent, investigate, and sanction acts of corruption. It establishes explicit sanctions, along with mechanisms for a coordinated response in the fight against corruption that involves civil society and government agencies at all levels (Fonseca 2019; Meyer and Hinojosa 2018). The SNA reform implied the creation of a coordinating committee (“*Comité Coordinador*”) with representatives from seven anticorruption institutions in charge of establishing and implementing the national anticorruption strategy,⁸ an executive office in charge of providing technical assistance and assessing implementation (SESNA), and 32 state-level anticorruption systems. The secondary laws for the reform were published in the official journal of the federation in July 2016.⁹ The SNA constitutional reforms required states to create local anticorruption systems modeled after the federal system’s structure. In order to do this, Mexico’s unicameral state legislatures had timelines to harmonize their constitutions and create local councils, oversight bodies, and specialized courts with jurisdiction to sanction acts of corruption.

⁸ The committee has representatives from the Ministry of Civil Service (SFP), Judicial Power (PJF), the National Institute of Transparency (INAI), the Committee of Citizen Participation, the Anticorruption Prosecutor, the Supreme Audit Institution (ASF), and the Federal Tribunal of Administrative Justice (TFJA).


⁹ These were seven general laws on the administrative responsibilities of public officials, accountability and monitoring of public resources, the penal code, etcetera. Find details on the content of these laws on the appendix section 1.

The Mexican context provides a unique opportunity to explore the effect of electoral incentives, since the time window that state legislatures had to harmonize their constitutions and create local anticorruption systems overlaps with the period when legislators with reelection incentives were taking office for the first time in 80 years. As part of the Mexican Pact Accord (*“Pacto por México”*), the three largest parties during Enrique Peña Nieto’s administration (PRI, PAN, and PRD) advanced a series of structural reforms in 2014. These included changes to the electoral system. Most significantly, the reform lifted an 80-year-old ban on reelection that had been in place since the PNR (precursor of PRI) consolidated its power after the Mexican Revolution. The reform considered legislators and mayors but excluded governors and presidents. The reelection reform was a novel development for Mexico’s party-centered system, where deputies primarily rely on parties as the means to secure a political office.¹⁰ With the reform in place, deputies could run for consecutive reelection and remain in the same office for up to 4 terms (12 years). For state legislatures, which are comprised of both SMD and PR deputies (see appendix section 2 for details on the composition of state legislatures), the reelection reform had a staggered implementation across states (Motolinia 2021). Since the electoral calendar in Mexico is historically asynchronous, and states have elections in different years, state legislatures provide a rare source of variation in reelection incentives unrelated to the key dates of the SNA reforms. While all states faced the same pressures to harmonize their constitutions, legislators could only run for reelection in some states. Figure 1 illustrates the staggered pattern of the reelection reform. Fourteen states had reelection-eligible deputies that took office in 2015, twelve states in 2016, two

¹⁰ Running as an independent is another alternative. However, independent candidacies were only permitted as of 2015 (Bruhn and Wuhs 2016)

in 2017, and four in 2018. There is considerable regional variation in the states where reelection was enabled in the same year. In 2016, for example, we can observe states in the north (Chihuahua), south (Oaxaca), pacific coast (Sinaloa), and the Gulf of Mexico (Veracruz).

Figure 1. Geographic variation in the timing of the reelection reform




Note: Colors mark the first year when reelection-eligible state deputies took office.

Figure 2 illustrates the overlap between the two reforms. The years between 2015 and 2017 are divided into two periods (January-July and August-December).¹¹ The gray bars indicate when deputies with reelection incentives took office and dotted lines mark the major dates of the National Anticorruption System (SNA) reforms. There were two timelines for the harmonization process. The first one began with the approval of the federal legislation and gave states over a year starting on April 28, 2015 and ending on October 25, 2016. The second deadline was for the secondary laws, giving states exactly one year starting July 18, 2016. While states were required to comply, there were no explicit consequences for failing to meet the deadlines, and deputies could decide whether they individually devoted time and effort towards drafting legislation that complied with federal requirements and public demand. As of 2018, 21 out of 32 states had harmonized their legislation to comply with the constitutional mandate (Fonseca 2019). By 2021, all states had done so.¹²

¹¹ Since subnational elections are often conducted June-July and elected officials take office in the second half of the year, I divide each year into two periods.

¹² Find the latest report on the official website of the SNA. <https://www.sna.org.mx/como-vamos/>

Figure 2. The overlap between the SNA reforms and the reelection reform



Note: Gray bars mark when reelection-eligible deputies took office, and dotted lines are the dates related to the SNA reform. The general anticorruption system reform (in red) gave states over a year (April 28, 2015-October 25, 2016). The secondary laws reform (in blue) gave states one year starting July 18, 2016.

I expect legislators with reelection incentives to be more likely to advance anticorruption reform. Compared to term-limited legislators, those with reelection incentives can reap the reputational benefits of advancing popular policies that signal integrity. Similar to how politicians who have engaged in corruption can expect electoral accountability (De Vries and Solaz 2017; Ferraz and Finan 2011), legislators with reelection incentives can be punished by voters if they fail to enact anticorruption legislation when anticorruption sentiment is high.

Reelection incentives (H1): Deputies with reelection incentives will be more likely to sponsor anticorruption initiatives, compared to term-limited deputies.

Data and methods

I explore the effect of electoral incentives by leveraging an original dataset of anticorruption legislative initiatives introduced to state legislatures in Mexico. Information on bills comes from publicly available data on the websites of state legislatures or information requests filed through the federal transparency portal.¹³ Data on legislative initiatives at the subnational level vary concerning availability, quality, and format. While states are required by law to respond to information requests, some are more responsive than others, and in several instances officials replied with incomplete information or broken links.¹⁴ Out of the 32 states, I successfully gathered the records of legislative initiatives introduced to 26 state legislatures before and after deputies with reelection incentives took office.¹⁵ For all but two states (Coahuila and Morelos), I found all

¹³ The transparency portal can be accessed through the following link:

<https://www.plataformadetransparencia.org.mx/web/guest/>

¹⁴ By the time data collection was concluded, some states had either not responded, not kept records of their initiatives for part of the period of interest, presented incomplete information (names of sponsors or dates were missing), or had the information in a format that was not readily available for sharing. This was only true for Coahuila, Morelos, the State of Mexico, San Luis Potosi, Veracruz, and Yucatan.

¹⁵ The earliest legislatures considered started in 2011 (Baja California Sur), and the latest ended in 2021 (Mexico City, Nayarit, Puebla, Sonora).

initiatives between 2015 and 2017.¹⁶ Out of a sample of 59,000 initiatives, I drew and read through random samples of initiatives, devising an original anticorruption dictionary.¹⁷ I then used the anticorruption dictionary to identify a preliminary sample of initiatives to hand-code. I identified 657 anticorruption initiatives (ACIs), matching them to the state legislators (deputies) that sponsored them.

I measure anticorruption action through the sponsorship of anticorruption initiatives (ACIs). I focus on bill sponsorship because compared to self-reported preferences, campaign speeches, or calls to action on social media, bill sponsorship goes beyond rhetoric and signals a more credible commitment to anticorruption.¹⁸ Regardless of whether legislation is eventually approved, through bill sponsorship legislators can take positions on issues, raise awareness, and credit claim their actions in support of a specific issue (Aleman and Calvo 2010; Schiller 1995). Examples of news stories and social media posts in the appendix section 3 show how local legislators often showcase their anticorruption legislative activity. These actions are far from costless. Bill sponsorship takes time, effort, legal expertise, and resources spent on information acquisition, coordination, and proposal drafting (Barnes 2016). Bill sponsorship also implies

¹⁶ Appendix section 4 includes information on data coverage.

¹⁷ Common terms associated with ACIs were: “*corruption, transparency, impunity, opacity, bribery, audit, irregularity, nepotism, embezzling, sanctions, money laundering.*” Find the complete dictionary in the appendix section 5.

¹⁸ Unlike roll-call voting, introducing an ACI constitutes a stronger stance since it implies prioritizing the issue and devoting significant time and resources to its creation. Additionally, reliable records of roll-call voting at the subnational level are rare.

opportunity costs. If alternative issues can garner more voter support, then the time and effort spent drafting a particular bill could have been spent more wisely. Advancing bills on divisive issues can also have political costs. If an issue is contentious, it could mobilize opposition among constituents, interest groups, and colleagues (Schiller 1995). Going against party lines and advancing a legislative agenda perceived as divisive and contentious, for example, could jeopardize a legislator's future career opportunities.

To identify anticorruption initiatives (ACIs), I utilized the following definition—*“legislation that attempts to preclude corrupt activities through concrete actions.”* I consider ACIs those pieces of legislation that include concrete actions, recommendations, or steps that, if followed, the expectation would be a reduction in the current levels of corruption or situations that create opportunities for corruption. The quality and availability of data varied considerably by state. In many instances, bills only provided one or two sentences as a preview of the bill's content, and source information was unavailable.¹⁹ I relied on a conservative coding scheme that only considered bills that explicitly indicated actions against corruption with the available information. For the purpose of this study, I consider the following corrupt actions: embezzling, diversion of funds, illicit enrichment, public procurement fraud, nepotism, influence peddling, bribery, electoral malfeasance (clientelism, vote-buying, fraud), and financial crimes (money laundering, shell companies, off shore accounts). Common examples of actions against corruption include legislation that harmonizes state constitutions with the SNA, proposals to strengthen anticorruption agencies, proposals to end procedural immunity for politicians, restrictions on clientelism, public procurement transparency, checks against nepotism, calls for auditing suspicious activity in

¹⁹ Find examples of high and low quality legislation data in the appendix section 6.

government, open government policies and transparency requirements, and sanctions for malfeasance and illicit enrichment.²⁰

Identification strategy

To explore the relationship between reelection incentives and anticorruption reform, I leverage the years when the SNA and the reelection reform were overlapping and deputies were experiencing electoral pressures to harmonize their local constitutions (2015-2017). As the main empirical approach, I implement a *multiple periods difference-in-differences* strategy (Callaway and Sant’Anna 2021). While fixed effects specifications allow for the exploration of different dimensions of variation while holding group-level confounders constant, two-way fixed effects have been shown to face major drawbacks in the presence of more than two time periods or when treatment effects vary across units and in time (Callaway and Sant’Anna 2021; Goodman-Bacon 2021). In these settings, the *multiple periods* DiD strategy has the advantage of providing interpretable causal parameters while allowing for treatment effect heterogeneity and dynamic effects.

Equation 1 illustrates the *multiple periods* DiD framework. The unit of analysis is a deputy “ i ” in treatment group “ g ” and time “ t .” Since subnational elections are often conducted in June-July and elected officials take office in the second half of the year, I divide each year into two, creating six time periods (“ t ”) for the years between 2015-2017. The essence of the multiperiod DiD design is dividing units into treatment groups according to when treatment is first applied, and then comparing these groups in time. In the context of this study, state legislatures are divided into treatment groups (“ g ”) depending on *when* deputies with reelection incentives took office

²⁰ See appendix section 9 for more details on the content of anticorruption initiatives.

between 2015 and 2017 (appendix section 7 shows the states in each treatment group). In the first time period no groups are treated, and throughout the period of analysis deputies with reelection incentives are compared to term-limited deputies in the control group (the “*not-yet-treated*” group).²¹ The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is generalized to define group-period average treatment effects, as shown in equation (1). ATT is the average treatment effect on the treated for units in group “*g*” and time “*t*”:²²

$$ATT(g, t) = E[Y_t(g) - Y_t(0) | G = g] \quad (1)$$

To assess responsiveness to the SNA reform, the outcome of the multiperiod DiD models is the number of *SNA-related* bills sponsored by each deputy.²³ This measure considers only

²¹ Models in the appendix also restrict the control group to only consider “*never treated*” cases. “*Never treated*” states are those that had term-limited deputies during the period of analysis (2015-2017).

²² For example, $ATT(3, 4)$ is the average treatment effect for units that become treated in period 3, at period 4. In the context of the study, where 5 groups of states become treated at some point and there are 6 periods (years halves between 2015-2017), $ATT(2015 \text{ (Aug – Dec)}, 2)$ would be the average treatment effect for states treated in August-December (2015) at their second semester of exposure to treatment.

²³ As noted by Kerevel (2015), the sponsor/cosponsor distinction is different in Mexico than in the US. Unless a bill is solo-authored, there are no ways to distinguish between “sponsors” and “cosponsors.” In my analysis, I consider all names attached to an ACI to be “sponsors.”

anticorruption initiatives that specifically address the harmonization requirements of the SNA reform (*SNA-related*). Since anticorruption initiatives can constitute a broad series of actions that vary in stringency and topic matter, focusing on *SNA-related* policies allows us to compare similar anticorruption activity and examine the extent to which deputies are responsive to demands to reform state constitutions and create local systems for a coordinated response to corruption, which would increase the monitoring and sanctioning of corruption. I estimate ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with bootstrapped standard errors clustered on treatment group. Summary statistics are available in the appendix section 8.

Results

Overall, results show that deputies in legislatures with reelection incentives were more responsive to the harmonization requirements of the National Anticorruption System (SNA) reform and more likely to introduce anticorruption initiatives (ACIs) compared to those in legislatures with term limits. Results are robust to alternative modeling strategies.

Table 1 plots the results of the *multiple periods* DiD strategy. Compared to the term-limited deputies in the control group, deputies with reelection incentives were more likely to sponsor *SNA-related* initiatives. The upper panel of Table 1 shows that the overall treatment effect (0.063) is statistically significant at the 95 percent level.²⁴ The lower panel shows the treatment group estimates. The overall effect of reelection incentives is mainly driven by states treated in 2015 (August-December), 2016 (August-December), and 2017 (January-July). The first two groups

²⁴ The overall effect is the average of all group-time treatment effects, with weights proportional to group size.

have the larger and more representative samples of states (fourteen and eleven states, respectively). In contrast, states treated in 2016 (January-July) or 2017 (August-December) do not show a significant effect. These groups lack representativeness, however, with each group having deputies from only one state.²⁵

Table 1. Estimates of the effect of reelection on SNA bill sponsorship

<i>Overall effect</i>				
	ATT	St. Error	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Reelection incentives	0.063**	0.012	0.0384	0.0883
<i>Group estimates</i>				
	ATT	St. Error	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Treated in 2015 (Aug-Dec)	0.058**	0.014	0.0300	0.0858
Treated in 2016 (Jan-Jul)	-0.023	0.020	-0.0627	0.0159
Treated in 2016 (Aug-Dec)	0.077**	0.020	0.0367	0.1169
Treated in 2017 (Jan-Jul)	0.252**	0.100	0.0554	0.4493
Treated in 2017 (Aug-Dec)	0.051	0.050	-0.0472	0.1498

Note: OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors clustered on treatment group. Upper panel shows the overall effect, and lower panel the treatment effects by group (*not-yet-treated* control group as baseline. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01


Figure 3 plots the dynamic treatment effects, which explore how effects evolve with length of exposure to treatment. The length of exposure to treatment (x-axis) becomes relative for each treatment group, with t=1 corresponding to the first period when units become treated. Negative time periods and zero are those before units become treated (black) and positive time periods are

²⁵ 2016 (January-July) includes the state of Tabasco and 2017 (August-December) the state of Nayarit.

post-intervention (gray). In line with expectations, post-treatment periods showcase positive and statistically significant treatment effects. Figure 3 also provides information on the persistence of treatment effects. Results show that effects increase progressively and peak 1.5 years after units are treated, giving credence to the idea that bill sponsorship is not costless and requires time. Eventually cases with reelection incentives become less likely to sponsor SNA-related bills than the control group. While this effect is not statistically different from the pre-treatment period ($t=0$), it can be explained by the difference in responsiveness to the SNA harmonization requirements. Deputies in legislatures with reelection incentives had a more timely response to the SNA timelines compared to deputies in term-limited legislatures. The positive treatment effect of reelection incentives eventually decreases and becomes negative because the states in the control group eventually begin working on the harmonization requirements, by the time legislatures with reelection incentives had fulfilled the requirements.

Estimates in the pre-treatment period are all either zero or very close to zero ($t=0$ being the exception), which provides evidence in support of parallel trends assumption. Group-time effect plots in the appendix (section 10) also provide additional evidence for parallel trends, showing that the negative effect at $t=0$ is driven by the “*Treated in 2017 (Jan-Jul)*” group, which only includes the state of Tlaxcala. Additional analyses in the appendix 10 re-runs the main specifications of the *multiple periods* DiD model with “never treated” in the control group, finding consistent results.

Figure 3. Dynamic treatment effects of reelection incentives on SNA-related bill sponsorship



Note: The outcome variable is the number of *SNA-related* bills sponsored by deputy over a given period. The y-axis is SNA-related sponsorship, and the x-axis is the timing of treatment (with $t=1$ corresponding to the first period when units become treated). The omitted “*not-yet-treated*” group serves as the control group. OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors clustered on treatment groups.

Additional tests

I implement a series of additional analyses that underscore the robustness of results. While the *SNA-related* measure allows us to assess responsiveness to the SNA harmonization requirements, they are not the only type of anticorruption initiatives sponsored in this time period. Additionally, the Mexican case presents variation in district type (single-member district vs. proportional representation deputies) and opposition status (in governor's coalition vs. opposition). To gain more insight into the strategic calculus of anticorruption bill sponsorship, Table 2 explores heterogeneous treatment effects and reports the results of several fixed effects specifications predicting the sponsorship of ACIs and *SNA-related* bills with a binary indicator for reelection incentives (1=could run for reelection, 0=term-limited).

Models 1-2 include state and year fixed effects, predicting *SNA-related* and ACI sponsorship with reelection incentives. Models 3-4 condition for time-varying pre-treatment covariates for deputies—such as membership to the president or the governor's coalition— and states—such as the margin of victory in the last gubernatorial election, the population in the state, the percentage of the rural population, the yearly congressional budget per deputy (log) as a measure of legislative capacity,²⁶ and the rate of civilians experiencing corruption by public officials.²⁷ To explore heterogeneous treatment effects,

²⁶ This number is calculated by dividing the legislature's yearly budget by the number of deputies in the Chamber. Data from IMCO (Mexican Institute for Competitiveness).

²⁷ Data from the National Institute of Geography and Statistics (INEGI). The corruption measure comes from the National Survey of Government Quality and Impact (ENCIG).

models 5-6 interact reelection incentives with a binary variable for SMD deputies, and models 7-8 interact reelection incentives with membership to the governor's coalition. Throughout specifications, the coefficient for reelection incentives shows a strong and statistically significant association. Overall, deputies with reelection incentives were more likely to sponsor ACIs and comply with federal requirements to create and harmonize local anticorruption legislation (*SNA-related*). The effect of reelection incentives is sizeable in terms of the variation of SNA sponsorship. If we consider the variation of SNA sponsorship that is not accounted for with state and year fixed effects, the estimate of column (3) would constitute 22.3 percent of one standard deviation of the unexplained variation of the outcome.²⁸ The effect of reelection incentives is not conditional on district type or opposition status. Reelection incentivized the sponsorship of anticorruption initiatives for both SMD and PR deputies, as well as opposition and members of the governor's coalition. Models in the appendix find that results are consistent with a binary versions of the outcome variables and using negative binomial specifications (section 11).

This nationally representative survey reports the rate of respondents experiencing corruption by a public official.

²⁸ To benchmark the estimates of Table 2, I use the variation yet to be explained after including state and year fixed effects. I first calculate the residuals of a model that predicts *SNA-related* sponsorship with only state and year fixed effects, isolating the portion of the variation left to be explained by reelection incentives and covariates. I then average the standard deviation of the residuals for all states.

Table 2. Reelection incentives, district type, and membership to the governor's coalition

	ACI	SNA	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Reelection incentives	0.06*** (0.02)	0.05*** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.05* (0.03)
Reelection X SMD					0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)		
Reelection X Governor's							0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.03)
SMD					0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)		
Governor's coalition			-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
President's coalition			-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02* (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Margin of victory			-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
Population (log)			0.47*** (0.11)	0.35** (0.14)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.35** (0.14)	0.47*** (0.11)	0.35** (0.14)
Rural population (%)			-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
Victims of corruption			-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)	-0.01** (0.00)
Deputy budget (log)			0.08 (0.07)	-0.24*** (0.09)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.24*** (0.09)	0.08 (0.07)	-0.24*** (0.09)
Observations	6,902	6,902	6,569	6,569	6,566	6,566	6,569	6,569
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.09	0.12	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.10	0.10

Note: OLS regressions predicting ACI and SNA-related sponsorship. Standard errors clustered on state. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Models in the appendix also compare ACI sponsorship between full legislative terms pre and post-treatment.²⁹ While the overlap between the two reforms provides a unique source of variation, two years constitute a short amount of time for bill sponsorship. Additionally, legislators could have different levels of experience if they are compared at different stages of their terms. Models that consider full legislative terms would provide complete information on the extent to which deputies sponsored ACIs regardless of legislative cycles or different levels of experience. Summary statistics and regression results for these models are shown in the appendix sections 7 and 12, respectively, finding consistent results. Findings also show that, while the effects of reelection incentives are larger for deputies elected under SMD, the difference between SMD and PR deputies is not statistically significant at the 95 percent level.

A unique feature of this design is a series of shocks coming from high-profile corruption scandals in 2014, which made corruption a salient issue for citizens and politicians in the country (Fonseca 2019; Merino 2015). While this study is not able to exploit exogenous subnational variation in the salience of corruption, high salience in the country is thus interpreted as a scope condition, and leveraged as a shock that produced variation in the outcome variable—it allows us to test whether deputies with reelection incentives are more likely to sponsor anticorruption initiatives when corruption is a salient issue. In line with this expectation, the appendix section 9 shows that the number of sponsored ACIs in state legislatures rose considerably after 2014 and peaked during the

²⁹ Table appendix section 7 lists the dates for the legislatures before and after the reform.

years when the SNA reforms were debated and approved. After a few years, corruption lost salience, and the number of ACIs eventually decreased.

Sponsorship patterns illustrate that both individual legislators and parties strategically respond to anticorruption demands. Overall, in 20.9 percent of cases deputies who sponsored ACIs did so individually, in 44.4 percent the initiative had multiple co-sponsors, and in 34.6 percent the initiative was co-sponsored by all party members.³⁰ Analyses in the appendix also explore the effect of reelection incentives within parties. Models in the appendix section 13 show that the effect of reelection incentives was present for deputies in a broad set of parties—such as *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN), *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI), *Partido de la Revolución Democrática* (PRD), *Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional* (MORENA), and *Movimiento Ciudadano* (MC).

Finally, I develop an original coding scheme for classifying anticorruption initiatives based on their subject matter in the appendix section 9. This analysis provides insight into the types of initiatives deputies are more willing to sponsor. Findings suggest that deputies mostly sponsor to satisfy external pressures for reform, strategically seek to inconvenience political rivals, and are more likely to sponsor policies with innocuous consequences. The most popular category were policies related to the harmonization of the National Anticorruption System (*SNA-related*), an official requirement backed by civil

³⁰ For the rate of party sponsorship, I consider cases where all deputies from the same party sponsored the initiative *and* there were at least two deputies from said party in the legislature. Find descriptive plots of ACI sponsorship by party and the share of bills co-signed by the whole party in the appendix section 13.

society and public pressure. Policies related to oversight and transparency efforts were also popular. The former includes policies that seek to increase monitoring through audits or investigations. Most of these initiatives are requests for auditing suspicious government activity, which could be politicized to target politicians from other parties. The latter includes efforts to improve transparency, such as access to information policies or transparency requirements for government agencies and public officials. Both the oversight and transparency categories more than double the number of policies that seek to raise penalties for corruption, for example, which could highly inconvenience politicians if implemented. Other policies with mild consequences entail efforts to raise awareness of corruption as a problem—such as establishing awareness campaigns or an official “anticorruption week”—or efforts that expand normativity on legislation related to corruption—such as updates to existing legislation or amends that clarify key legal terms or the responsibilities of actors in charge of fighting corruption.

Conclusion

While anticorruption reform is popular with voters, politicians rarely advance these policies because they can carry significant costs and limit rents acquired through corrupt means. When will the benefits of anticorruption reform outweigh the costs? In this paper, I argue that politicians will be more likely to advance anticorruption reform when the electoral benefits of anticorruption reform increase. I theorize that legislators with reelection incentives will be more likely to advance anticorruption reform and leverage 1) original data on anticorruption initiatives introduced to state legislatures in Mexico and 2) an overlap between a constitutional reform that required states to create local anticorruption

systems and a reelection reform that created subnational variation in term limits. Consistent with expectations and through different empirical strategies, I find that legislators with reelection incentives were more likely to introduce anticorruption initiatives and comply with the creation of local anticorruption systems. Findings from this study suggest that—even in highly corrupt systems such as Mexico—electoral incentives can drive politicians to advance anticorruption reform.

This study presents three main contributions. First, exploring the conditions under which politicians advance anticorruption reform would significantly contribute to theoretical gaps in two distinct literatures. While research on anticorruption has underscored the lack of political support for anticorruption among politicians as the most pressing challenge for meaningful reform (Rotberg 2020), previous studies have primarily focused on evaluating policy implementation (Szakonyi 2020; Doig and Riley 1998; Butt 2011). Doing so considerably limits the number and types of cases under study since only a subset of all anticorruption initiatives make it to the implementation phase. Moreover, considering only implemented policies overlooks the politics that drive the selection process of anticorruption initiatives. Studying legislative initiatives would allow us to explore *when* and *why* politicians advance anticorruption efforts systematically. On the other hand, legislative studies have overlooked the importance of anticorruption policies, with few studies exploring whether personalized incentives could drive politicians to promote anticorruption legislation (Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits 2016).

The second contribution is empirical. So far, small sample sizes and concerns over the lack of comparability across countries have limited the number of comparative studies of anticorruption policies. By exploiting subnational sources of variation, this study

provides a setting with controlled comparisons and fine-grained data. Lastly, this paper has practical implications for policy-making. In the last two decades, the anticorruption industry has invested millions of dollars promoting measures that effectively fight corruption (Sampson 2010). However, results have so far been mixed, with scholars suggesting that the main reason anticorruption policies underperform is the lack of political will to fight corruption (Johnston and Fritzen 2021; Rothstein 2009). Findings from this study show that even in highly corrupt countries, electoral incentives can encourage politicians to advance anticorruption reform.

Findings encourage research that explores the conditions under which politicians are more likely to advance anticorruption reform. This study presents an important scope condition—high salience in corruption derived from a series of high-profile corruption scandals. Results highlight the challenges that anticorruption reformers face: Electoral incentives have an effect that is *conditional* on corruption being a salient issue. Even with the combined effect of pressures from civil society, reelection incentives, and official requirements to create local anticorruption systems, most legislators chose not to sponsor anticorruption initiatives. Additionally, while electoral incentives could affect all politicians, this study focuses exclusively on legislators. Future work could explore how incentives for anticorruption action vary across political offices, particularly for those most likely to be targeted by anticorruption initiatives. This study also claims that anticorruption policies can be inconvenient for politicians. However, anticorruption policies show considerable variation in subject matter and costs. Politicians, for example, could choose to advance innocuous anticorruption reform to credit-claim corruption action without fearing the consequences of implementation. Future research could explore the overlap

between the factors that incentivize anticorruption sponsorship and disincentivize corruption, and leverage data on the content of anticorruption policies to explore how politicians balance the risks and benefits of anticorruption appeals in policy design. Finally, future work could also examine how variation in the salience of corruption, the levels of impunity in a country, and the individual characteristics of politicians affect the extent to which anticorruption initiatives are sponsored, debated, and approved.

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Supplementary materials

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1. Secondary laws of the National Anticorruption System

Secondary laws of the National Anticorruption System (SNA):

These were 7 laws, published on July 18, 2016:

1. *General Law of the National Anti-corruption System*. Established the bases for coordination between the Federation, the states, municipalities, and the City Halls of Mexico City for the operation of the SNA.
2. *General Law on Administrative Responsibilities*. Establishes the responsibilities and obligations of public servants. Includes sanctions whenever public officials incur for omissions and wrongdoing.
3. *Organic Law of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice*. Establishes the integration, organization, attributions, and functioning of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice (FCAJ). The FCAJ is a jurisdictional body with the autonomy to issue its rulings and with full jurisdiction.
4. *Law on Control and Accountability of the Federation*. Establishes the bases for the review and inspection of the Public Account and strengthens the role of the Superior Audit of the Federation (ASF).
5. *Organic Law of the Attorney General*. This existing law was reformed to establish the functions and powers of the Specialized Prosecutor's Office in matters of crimes related to corruption.
6. *Federal Criminal Code*. This existing law was reformed to harmonize the penal code with the SNA, now including the Code of Crimes for acts of corruption.
7. *Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration*. This existing law was reformed to establish the role of the Ministry of Public Administration as a fundamental part of the fight against corruption.

2. State legislatures in Mexico

State-level legislative power in Mexico is deposited in local unicameral congresses. These bodies are in charge of legislating on all matters that are not exclusive to the federal jurisdiction and approve budgets and state and municipal expenditures. Local legislatures also have the faculty to introduce legislative initiatives to the federal Congress, and to approve constitutional reforms previously approved by the federal Congress. Local legislatures are comprised of deputies elected through single-member districts (SMD) or proportional representation (PR) rules, and the number of representatives is proportional to the number of inhabitants in the state. Table A.1 shows the composition of state legislatures by district type. Deputies are elected for three year terms and, after the reelection reform, can be in office up to 4 terms (12 years). Deputies fulfill several roles: proposing and voting for legislative initiatives, revising and approving budgets, overseeing and monitoring public spending through the Vigilance Committee, and appointing officials to government agencies.

While there is variation in procedures and capacities, lawmaking in state legislatures mimics the structure of lawmaking at the federal level. Deputies and other actors (governors, ministers, and citizens) can introduce legislative initiatives, which are sent to committees by the “*Mesa Directiva*” to wait for a decision (“*Dictamen*”). There is wide variation in the number of days state legislatures have for reaching a decision, but most states have a 30 day deadline for deciding whether to endorse or reject a bill. If the committee report is positive, the initiative is sent back to the “*Mesa Directiva*” and a floor reading is scheduled. Generally, legislative initiatives all have to include legal foundations, the name of sponsors, motivation (“*Exposicion de motivos*”), and clarify the proposed changes.

Subnational legislatures in Mexico started to receive more attention after the transition to democracy, but research is still limited. Historically, lack of reelection has leads to high turnover rates, legislators with limited political experience, low specialization in committees, and subordination to local party leaders. Parliamentary groups have great power, since they can appoint committee members and bureaucratic officials in the legislature. However, recent studies have found that the reelection reform led to increases in the amount of attention legislators devote to legislative particularism (Motolinia 2021).

Table A.1 Composition of state legislatures

State	SMD	PR	Total
Aguascalientes	18	9	27
Baja California	17	8	25
Baja California Sur	16	5	21
Campeche	21	14	35
Coahuila	16	9	25
Colima	16	9	25
Chiapas	24	17	41
Chihuahua	22	11	33
Ciudad de México	33	33	66
Durango	15	10	25
Guanajuato	22	14	36
Guerrero	28	18	46
Hidalgo	18	12	30
Jalisco	20	19	39
México	45	30	75
Michoacán	24	16	40
Morelos	18	12	30
Nayarit	18	12	30
Nuevo León	26	16	42
Oaxaca	25	17	42
Puebla	26	15	41
Querétaro	15	10	25
Quintana Roo	15	10	25
San Luis Potosí	15	12	27
Sinaloa	24	16	40
Sonora	21	12	33
Tabasco	21	14	35
Tamaulipas	22	14	36
Tlaxcala	15	10	25
Veracruz	30	20	50
Yucatán	15	10	25
Zacatecas	18	12	30

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- Revels Vázquez, Francisco. 2011. “Los estudios sobre los congresos locales en México. Temas y problemas.” *Estudios Políticos* 23: 11–30.
- Motolinia, Lucia. 2021. “Electoral Accountability and Particularistic Legislation: Evidence from an Electoral Reform in Mexico.” *American Political Science Review* 115(1), 97-113.

3. Examples of anticorruption appeals by deputies

Below, I show several examples of local deputies publicizing their track record of legislative anticorruption work in social media (a), personal websites (b), and local news outlets (c). For convenience, local news outlet examples were translated using Google Translate's option to translate entire websites.

(a) Twitter (X)



(b) Personal websites



Source: <https://waldofernandez.com/>

(c) Local news

Deputy Eva Diego promotes the creation of the State Anti-Corruption System

e February 23, 2017, 15:04



q Statement | PRD

OAXACA, Oax. February 23, 2017.- The local PRD deputy and president of the Surveillance Commission of the Superior State Audit, Eva Diego Cruz, when leading the work of the parliamentary and citizen forums, pointed out that Oaxaca requires a comprehensive reform to create the State System to Combat Corruption.

Source: <https://oaxaca.quadratin.com.mx/impulsa-diputada-eva-diego-creacion-del-sistema-estatal-anticorrupcion/>

LOCAL / THURSDAY JUNE 29, 2017

Laffitte asks for autonomy for the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office



Enrique Javier Laffitte Bretón, president of the Commission on Constitutional Points and Legislation.

Source: <https://www.elsoldecuernavaca.com.mx/local/pide-laffitte-autonomia-para-fiscalia-anticorrupcion-1203593.html>

4. Details on data coverage

For 26 out of 32 states I managed to find the entirety of anticorruption initiatives in the legislatures before and after the reelection reform. For Coahuila there was no data on the names of sponsors for bills after 2016. For the state of Mexico there was not available data on bills before 2014. For Morelos, the period before 2015 did not include the exact date when the initiative was introduced, and therefore could only be used for legislature-level models. Finally, the states of San Luis Potosí, Veracruz, and Yucatán did not provide data prior to 2015.

Table A.2 Data coverage

State	Data collection status
Aguascalientes	Complete
Baja California	Complete
Baja California Sur	Complete
Campeche	Complete
Coahuila	Partial (no data on sponsor names after 2016)
Colima	Complete
Chiapas	Complete
Chihuahua	Complete
Ciudad de México	Complete
Durango	Complete
Guanajuato	Complete
Guerrero	Complete
Hidalgo	Complete
Jalisco	Complete
México	Partial (missing before 2014)
Michoacán	Complete
Morelos	Partial (no information on dates available)
Nayarit	Complete
Nuevo León	Complete
Oaxaca	Complete
Puebla	Complete
Querétaro	Complete
Quintana Roo	Complete
San Luis Potosí	Partial (missing before 2015)
Sinaloa	Complete
Sonora	Complete
Tabasco	Complete
Tamaulipas	Complete
Tlaxcala	Complete
Veracruz	Partial (missing before 2015)
Yucatán	Partial (missing before 2015)
Zacatecas	Complete

5. Anticorruption dictionary

Table A.3 Anticorruption dictionary

English	Spanish
Corruption	Corrupcion corrupecion Corrupción corrupción Corrupt* corrupt*
Anticorruption	Anti-corrupecion anti-corrupecion Anti-corrupción anti-corrupción Anticorrupción anticorrupción
Transparency	Transparencia transparencia
Impunity	Impunidad impunidad
Opacity	Opacidad opacidad
Bribery	Soborno* soborno* Soborna* soborna*
Audit	Auditor* auditor*
Irregularity	Irregularidad* irregularidad*
Influence peddling	Tráfico de influencia* tráfico de influencia*
Nepotism	Nepotismo nepotismo
Clientelism	Clientelismo clientelismo
Vote buying	Compra de voto* compra de voto
Fraud	Fraude fraude
Illegitimate	Ilegítimo ilegítimo
Blackmail	Chantaje chantaje
Embezzling	Malversación malversación desvio desvío desvio de recursos peculado
Cronyism	Compadrazgo compadrazgo
Co-opt	Cooptación cooptación Cooptar cooptar
Money laundering	Lavado de dinero lavado de dinero
Offshore	Offshore offshore
Shell companies	Empresas fantasma empresas fantasma empresa fantasma Empresa fantasma
Sanctions	Sanciones sanciones Sanción sanción Sancionar sancionar
Gifts	Regal*

6. Details on anti-corruption legislation

Figures A.1-A.2 showcase the wide variation on data quality by state. Some states had more informative content and included access to source documentation, such as Sonora and Chihuahua in Figure A.1. The initiative on the left (a) aims to incorporate a monitoring system for government spending into the local anticorruption system, and the one on the right (b) introduces fines for political parties whose members engage in acts of corruption. Most initiatives follow a standard format, starting with a general motivation (“*Exposición de motivos*”) followed by a summary of the proposal, the modifications or additions to existing legal codes, and the signature of sponsoring deputies. Other states only provided blurry PDFs and incomplete information. In cases such as Tlaxcala (A.2), source documents only provided one or two sentences on the content of the initiative.

Figure A.1 Example of a high quality data sources

(a) Sonora

C. DIP. LUIS ARMANDO COLOSIO MUÑOZ. *(Este día vengo a plantear mi primera iniciativa, en estos 6 meses que tenemos como legislatura, y considero que hemos tenido buenas iniciativas por parte de muchos, pero creo que esta es muy importante y trascendente para la vida del Congreso, y me gustaría que la escucharan con atención, porque tiene mucho que ver con lo que nos sucedió el 13 de agosto de 2018, antes de tomar posesión, la anterior legislatura nos arrancó un pedazo del alma, y con esto podemos recuperar un poquito de esa esencia que tiene el Congreso, de fiscalizar puntualmente los recursos públicos, y tiene que ver con la honestidad, la transparencia, y la anticorrupción).*

HONORABLE ASAMBLEA:

El suscrito, **LUIS ARMANDO COLOSIO MUÑOZ**, diputado integrante del Grupo Parlamentario de Morena de esta Sexagésima Segunda Legislatura, en ejercicio de las atribuciones previstas por los artículos 53, fracción III de la Constitución Política del Estado de Sonora y 32, fracción II de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Legislativo del Estado de Sonora, presento a la consideración de esta Asamblea Legislativa, **INICIATIVA CON PROYECTO DE DECRETO QUE REFORMA Y ADICIONA DIVERSAS DISPOSICIONES DE LA LEY DEL SISTEMA ESTATAL ANTICORRUPCIÓN**, misma que sustento bajo el tenor de la siguiente:

EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS

A lo largo del tiempo, los organismos encargados del control y la fiscalización de la gestión pública han estado presentes dentro o fuera de la estructura gubernamental de nuestro país, con el principal objetivo de promover acciones relacionadas con la redición de cuentas de los gobernantes en turno, buscando con esto garantizar la correcta aplicación de los recursos públicos.

La supervivencia histórica de estos organismos, incluso sobre otros considerados esenciales para el desarrollo social y económico del país y, pese a los ajustes y desequilibrios que ha sufrido el gobierno, se debe, en estricto sentido, a la estructura organizacional que debe distinguirse a nuestro sistema democrático y no por el valor que le pueda otorgar a la gestión gubernamental.

En esencia, los órganos de control y fiscalización son los pilares que sostienen el principio de legalidad en cada uno de los tres poderes y de los tres niveles de gobierno; por ello, su ausencia o debilidad está directamente relacionada con los niveles de discrecionalidad, opacidad y corrupción de un gobierno.

Actualmente existe un amplio andamiaje regulatorio y estructural de control y fiscalización, tanto al interior como al exterior de los distintos órganos que desempeñan funciones de gobierno. A nivel federal se encuentra la Auditoría Superior de la Federación, la Secretaría de la Función Pública, las Contralorías de las entidades

(b) Chihuahua



H. CONGRESO DEL ESTADO
DE CHIHUAHUA

"2018. Año del Centenario del Natalicio de José Fuentes Mares"

Grupo Parlamentario del Partido Verde Ecologista de México

H. CONGRESO DEL ESTADO.
PRESENTE.

Los Suscritos, Alejandro Gloria González y Hever Quezada Flores, en nuestro carácter de Diputados de la Sexagésima Quinta Legislatura e integrantes del Grupo Parlamentario del Partido Verde Ecologista de México, con fundamento en lo dispuesto por los artículos 1 y 68, fracción I, de la Constitución Política del Estado de Chihuahua; los artículos 57, 167 fracción I, 168 y 169 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Legislativo, así como 13 fracción IV, 75, 76 y 77 fracción I, del Reglamento Interior y de Prácticas Parlamentarias del Poder Legislativo, es que nos permitimos someter a la consideración de esta Soberanía, iniciativa con carácter de DECRETO, a fin de añadir un artículo 48 BIS a la Ley de Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado de Chihuahua, en materia de responsabilidad solidaria de los partidos políticos ante hechos de corrupción cometidos por servidores públicos.

Lo anterior, sustentado en la siguiente:

EXPOSICIÓN DE MOTIVOS

Los dos grandes problemas de México y las dos grandes preocupaciones de los ciudadanos son la inseguridad y la corrupción, ambos tienen una misma causa, un mismo origen: la ausencia de estado de derecho. También, ambas problemáticas comparten una similitud que permite su subsistencia: la impunidad.

Figure A.2 Example of a low quality data source (Tlaxcala)

5	29-I-15	Iniciativa con proyecto de Decreto, por el que se adiciona la fracción XII al artículo 48 de la Ley de Comunicaciones y Transportes del Estado de Tlaxcala; que presentan los Diputados Julio César Hernández Mejía y Tomas Federico Orea Albarrán.	Dip. Julio César Hernández Mejía Dip. Tomas Federico Orea Albarrán. Ya tiene iniciativa
6	29-I-15	Iniciativa con proyecto de Decreto, por el que se Crea la Ley Anticorrupción en Contrataciones Públicas para el Estado de Tlaxcala; que presenta la Diputada Patricia Zenteno Hernández.	Dip. Patricia Zenteno Hernández. Ya tiene iniciativa
7	29-I-15	Iniciativa con proyecto de Acuerdo, por el que se solicita al Gobernador del Estado, la comparecencia del Secretario de Gobernación, de la Procuradora del Estado y del Secretario de Seguridad Pública, así como a la Comisión de Protección Civil, Seguridad Pública, Prevención y Readaptación Social del Congreso haga las investigaciones a los elementos policiacos caídos: que presenta la Diputada Evangelina Paredes Zamora.	Dip. Evangelina Paredes Zamora. Ya tiene iniciativa
8	29-I-15	Iniciativa con proyecto de Acuerdo, por el que se declara los días 26 de cada mes del año como el "Día en demanda de justicia para los jóvenes estudiantes de la normal rural de Ayotzinapa, Guerrero, y sus familias"; que presenta la Diputada Eréndira Elsa Carlota Jiménez Montiel.	Dip. Eréndira Elsa Carlota Jiménez Montiel. Ya tiene iniciativa

7. Treatment status

Table A.4 reports the pre (last legislature with term-limits) and post treatment (first legislature with reelection incentives) legislatures for each state. The earliest legislatures started in 2011 and the latest ended in 2021.

Table A.4 Legislatures before/after treatment

State	Pre-treatment	Post-treatment
Aguascalientes	2013-2016	2016-2018
Baja California	2013-2016	2016-2018
Baja California Sur	2011-2015	2015-2018
Campeche	2012-2015	2015-2018
Coahuila	2015-2017	2018-2020
Colima	2012-2015	2015-2018
Chiapas	2012-2015	2015-2018
Chihuahua	2013-2016	2016-2018
Ciudad de México	2015-2018	2018-2021
Durango	2013-2016	2016-2018
Guanajuato	2012-2015	2015-2018
Guerrero	2012-2015	2015-2018
Hidalgo	2013-2016	2016-2018
Jalisco	2012-2015	2015-2018
México	2012-2015	2015-2018
Michoacán	2012-2015	2015-2018
Morelos	2012-2015	2015-2018
Nayarit	2014-2017	2017-2021
Nuevo León	2012-2015	2015-2018
Oaxaca	2013-2016	2016-2018
Puebla	2014-2018	2018-2021
Querétaro	2012-2015	2015-2018
Quintana Roo	2013-2016	2016-2019
San Luis Potosí	2012-2015	2015-2018
Sinaloa	2013-2016	2016-2018
Sonora	2015-2018	2018-2021
Tabasco	2013-2015	2016-2018
Tamaulipas	2013-2016	2016-2019
Tlaxcala	2014-2016	2017-2018
Veracruz	2013-2016	2016-2018
Yucatán	2012-2015	2015-2018
Zacatecas	2013-2016	2016-2018

Table A.5 reports the states in each treatment group for the multiple periods *difference-in-differences* strategy. The period indicates the moment when the first deputies with reelection incentives took office in the state.

Table A.5 Treatment groups for the multiple period DID approach

Period when treated	States
2015 (Aug-Dec)	Baja California Sur, Campeche, Colima, Chiapas, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Jalisco, Mexico, Michoacan, Morelos, Nuevo Leon, Queretaro, San Luis Potosi, Yucatan
2016 (Jan-Jul)	Tabasco
2016 (Aug-Dec)	Aguascalientes, Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Zacatecas
2017 (Jan-Jul)	Tlaxcala
2017 (Aug-Dec)	Nayarit
Never-treated	Coahuila, Mexico City, Puebla, Sonora

8. Summary statistics

Table A.6 reports the summary statistics for the models in Tables 1-2 in the main document (2015-2017). Table A.7 reports the summary statistics for the models that compare deputies between full legislative terms (last legislatures with term-limits and first legislatures with reelection eligible deputies, 2011-2021).

Table A.6 Summary statistics (2015-2017 models)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
SNA-related ACIs	6,929	0.076	0.434	0	9
ACIs	6,929	0.114	0.530	0	9
Reelection incentives	6,956	0.563	0.496	0	1
President's coalition	6,956	0.421	0.494	0	1
Governor's coalition	6,948	0.491	0.500	0	1
Margin of victory	6,956	14.95	14.05	0.12	49.73
Population (log)	6,956	15.05	0.78	13.48	16.60
Rural population (%)	6,956	24.57	14.59	0.50	52.70
Corruption victims (%)	6,956	88.37	5.16	73.30	96.29
Deputy budget (log)	6,604	16.082	0.564	14.801	17.177

Table A.7 Summary statistics (full legislative term models)

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
ACIs	2,096	0.545	1.257	0	11
Reelection incentives	2,299	0.505	0.500	0	1
SMD	2,300	0.605	0.489	0	1
PR	2,300	0.394	0.489	0	1
Governor's coalition	2,298	0.511	0.500	0	1

9. Descriptive plots for anticorruption initiatives

Figure A.3 shows the total ACIs sponsored per year, and Figure A.4 compares ACIs introduced to the last legislature with term limits (light gray) and the first legislature with reelection-eligible deputies (dark gray). I exclude states that had missing values at any point.

Figure A.3 Anticorruption initiatives (ACIs) in time






Figure A.4 Anticorruption initiatives (ACIs) and term limit status



I develop an original coding scheme for classifying anticorruption initiatives based on their subject matter (definitions in the following page). Figure A.5 plots the number of unique anticorruption initiatives sponsored by local deputies the legislatures before/after the reelection reform (2011-2021).

Figure A.5 Subject matter of anticorruption initiatives



Note: Unique anticorruption initiatives sponsored by local deputies for legislatures between 2011-2021.

Coding of initiatives

SNA-related: Initiatives that specifically address the harmonization requirements of the SNA reform. These include efforts to harmonize and create the secondary laws of the SNA at the state level (*General Law of the National Anti-corruption System, General Law on Administrative Responsibilities, Organic Law of the Federal Court of Administrative Justice, Law on Control and Accountability of the Federation, Organic Law of the Attorney General, Federal Criminal Code, Organic Law of the Federal Public Administration*).

Audits and investigations. Initiatives that increase monitoring through audits or investigations. These include requests for auditing suspicious government activity, measures that expand the capacities of actors to conduct investigations or audits, or that aim to improve the effectiveness of audits/investigations.

Transparency and open government. Efforts aimed at improving transparency in government, such as making public information more accessible, establishing transparency requirements for government agencies or public officials, or increasing oversight into finances or administrative procedures where corruption could happen.

Sanctions and incarceration. Initiatives centered on raising penalties for crimes of corruption, such as fines, prison, destitutions, and the removal of parliamentary immunity.

Normativity. Initiatives that create new regulations, update existing legislation, define key terms, clarify or establish new responsibilities for actors in charge of fighting corruption, or that regulate anticorruption and monitoring procedures.

Awareness. Measures that aim to reduce corruption by raising awareness, such as anticorruption campaigns, calling out suspicious government activity, educational campaigns, or proposals to establish anti-corruption awareness day/week/month/year.

Public procurement. Initiatives that aim to prevent corruption in public procurement processes.

Trading in influence. Initiatives that tackle the use of political influence in exchange for money and favors, such as influence peddling and nepotism.

Misappropriation and financial corruption. Initiatives aimed at preventing corruption with public funds or financial crimes. Examples include embezzling public funds or their deviation, and financial crimes such as bribery, money laundering, shell companies, and offshore accounts.

Appointments and background checks. Requirements and backgrounds checks for important positions in anticorruption institutions.

Anticorruption institutions. Initiatives that aims to create or empower anticorruption institutions. This includes expanding their powers, creating mechanisms for inter-institutional cooperation, introducing changes to rules and/or procedures to improve their efficiency, or creating new institutions.

Electoral malfeasance. Procedures, penalties, or actions against clientelism, vote-buying, and/or election fraud.

Whistleblower protections. Initiatives that seek to empower/protect individuals that report misconduct and corruption by public officials or to punish politicians that harm them.

Financial disclosures. Measures that have public officials disclose information on their assets or conflicts of interest.

10. Multiple periods difference-in-differences

Tables A.8 reports the overall and treatment group estimates of the effect of reelection for the multiple periods *difference-in-differences* strategy (“*never-treated*” units in the control group), finding consistent results.

Table A.8 Estimates of the effect of reelection on SNA bill sponsorship

<i>Overall effect</i>				
	ATT	St. Error	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Reelection incentives	0.057**	0.013	0.0314	0.0833
<i>Group estimates</i>				
	ATT	St. Error	[95% Conf. Int.]	
Treated in 2015 (Aug-Dec)	0.051**	0.014	0.0224	0.0802
Treated in 2016 (Jan-Jul)	-0.032	0.020	-0.0720	0.0087
Treated in 2016 (Aug-Dec)	0.073**	0.021	0.0298	0.1153
Treated in 2017 (Jan-Jul)	0.241**	0.100	0.0438	0.4390
Treated in 2017 (Aug-Dec)	0.051	0.050	-0.0472	0.1498

Note: OLS regressions with bootstrapped standard errors clustered on treatment group. Upper panel shows the overall effect, and lower panel the treatment effects by group (*never-treated* control group as baseline. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The following figures explore the treatment effect across group and time (A.6 using *not-yet-treated* units in the control group and A.7 *never-treated*). States are divided into six groups and compared with the never treated control group in time. Time periods correspond to the year halves, starting in Jan-Jun 2015 and ending in Jul-Dec 2017. Each grid presents deputies in one of our different treatment groups. The y-axis presents the estimate of reelection incentives on SNA-sponsorship, relative to the control group. Consistent with the group effects in the main text, I find that the groups with the largest and most diverse samples of states (those treated in the latter half of 2015 and 2016), drive the overall effect of reelection incentives.

Figure A.6 Group-time average treatment effects (*not-yet-treated*)





Figure A.7 Group-time average treatment effects (*never-treated*)



11. Additional regression tables

Table A.9 reports the results of running the models from Table 2 in the main text with binary versions of the outcome variables. Both the *SNA-related* and ACI now code as “1” cases where a deputy sponsored one or more initiatives in a given period. Results are consistent results.

Table A.9 Reelection incentives, district type, and membership to the governor’s coalition (binary outcomes)

	ACI	SNA	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Reelection incentives	0.04*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)
Reelection X SMD					0.02** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)		
Reelection X Governor’s							0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
SMD					0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)		
Governor’s coalition			0.02*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
President’s coalition			-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Margin of victory			-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)
Population (log)			0.41*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.07)	0.42*** (0.06)	0.38*** (0.07)	0.41*** (0.06)	0.37*** (0.07)
Rural population (%)			-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Victims of corruption			-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)
Deputy budget (log)			0.05 (0.04)	-0.00 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Observations	6,902	6,902	6,569	6,569	6,566	6,566	6,569	6,569
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.13	0.12	0.14	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.14	0.13

Note: OLS regressions predicting ACI and SNA-related sponsorship. Standard errors clustered on state. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.10 reports the results of running the models from Table 2 in the main text with negative binomial specifications, finding additional support for the *electoral incentives* hypothesis.

Table A.10 Reelection incentives, district type, and membership to the governor's coalition (negative binomials)

	ACI	SNA	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI	SNA	ACI
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Reelection incentives	1.90*** (0.33)	1.30*** (0.23)	1.82*** (0.38)	1.19*** (0.25)	1.89*** (0.43)	1.23*** (0.29)	1.82*** (0.41)	1.26*** (0.28)
Reelection X SMD					-0.11 (0.34)	-0.07 (0.25)		
Reelection X Governor's							0.01 (0.34)	-0.15 (0.25)
SMD					0.18 (0.32)	0.15 (0.23)		
Governor's coalition			-0.06 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.10)	-0.10 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.11)	-0.07 (0.32)	-0.01 (0.23)
President's coalition			-0.36*** (0.12)	-0.41*** (0.11)	-0.36*** (0.12)	-0.42*** (0.11)	-0.36*** (0.13)	-0.43*** (0.11)
Margin of victory			-0.17** (0.08)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.17** (0.08)	-0.12*** (0.04)	-0.17** (0.08)	-0.12*** (0.04)
Population (log)			8.10*** (2.03)	5.99*** (1.38)	8.13*** (2.03)	6.02*** (1.38)	8.10*** (2.03)	6.00*** (1.38)
Rural population (%)			-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	-0.06 (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)
Victims of corruption			0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)
Deputy budget (log)			2.63*** (0.82)	0.65 (0.55)	2.64*** (0.82)	0.65 (0.55)	2.63*** (0.82)	0.66 (0.55)
Observations	6,902	6,902	6,569	6,569	6,566	6,566	6,569	6,569
State FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Log Likelihood	-1,313.64	-1,828.76	-1,272.85	-1,780.04	-1,272.18	-1,778.93	-1,272.85	-1,779.87
theta	0.57***	0.48***	0.60***	0.49***	0.61***	0.50***	0.60***	0.50***
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,697.27	3,727.51	2,625.71	3,640.08	2,628.36	3,641.85	2,627.71	3,641.74

Note: Negative binomial regressions predicting ACI and SNA-related sponsorship. Standard errors clustered on state.

12. Full legislative term models

Table A.11 reports the estimates for the effect of reelection incentives on ACI sponsorship for models considering the full legislative term. Models (1-2, 7-8) include the full sample of deputies, and models (3-4) and (5-6) divide the sample into SMD and PR deputies, respectively. I find consistent results for the effect of reelection incentives. While coefficients for reelection are larger for SMD deputies (compared to PR deputies), the interaction between reelection incentives and SMD is not significant at the 95% level.

Table A.11 Reelection incentives, district type, and governor's coalition (full legislative terms)

	ACIs							
	Full sample		SMD		PR		Full sample	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Reelection incentives	0.66*** (0.05)	0.74*** (0.05)	0.72*** (0.07)	0.82*** (0.06)	0.56*** (0.08)	0.63*** (0.08)	0.63*** (0.08)	0.70*** (0.07)
Reelection X SMD							0.18* (0.09)	
Reelection X Governor's								0.08 (0.09)
SMD							-0.07 (0.07)	
Governor's coalition								-0.07 (0.07)
Observations	2,096	2,096	1,270	1,270	825	825	2,095	2,095
State FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
R ²	0.07	0.31	0.08	0.36	0.06	0.27	0.31	0.31

Note: OLS regressions predicting ACI sponsorship in a full legislative term. Columns 1-2 and 7-8 consider all deputies. Columns 3-4 only SMD deputies, and columns 5-6 only PR deputies. Standard errors clustered on state. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

13. Party analysis

Figure A.8 breaks down anticorruption bill sponsorship by party and co-sponsorship status. The unit of analysis is a deputy in a legislative term, and the co-sponsorship categories are: total anticorruption initiatives (“ACIs”), ACIs sponsored by all party members (“All party”), and ACIs sponsored by a single deputy (“Single sponsor”). Overall, in 20.9 percent of cases deputies that sponsored ACIs did so individually, in 44.4 percent the initiative was co-sponsored (excluding cases with all party members), and in 34.6 percent the initiative was sponsored by all party members. PAN, PRI, and PRD had deputies that sponsored most initiatives, and PAN was the party that engaged in more party-level co-sponsorship.

Figure A.8 Anticorruption sponsorship by party and co-sponsorship status





Figure A.9 reports the estimates of reelection incentives for split-sample models by party. Models predict ACI and SNA-related sponsorship and the unit of analysis is a deputy-period (2015-2017). I find that the effect was present in a wide range of parties such as PAN, PRI, and PRD. Reelection-eligible deputies in Morena were more likely to sponsor ACIs generally, but not SNA-related bills. For MC the opposite was true.

Figure A.9 Estimates of reelection incentives and anticorruption sponsorship by party



Note: Estimates of split-sample models predicting ACI sponsorship, 95% CIs.